For as far as the Persians were concerned, the Marathon campaign had been a minor punitive expedition. King Darius had died in 485 BC, and his son Xerxes was initially occupied with a revolt in Egypt (Hdt. VII 7). But thereafter preparations for the full-scale invasion of Greece began and according to Herodotus (VII 20) lasted for four years. These preparations reveal a different empire from that of earlier generations. Where Cyrus the Great had engaged in swift campaigns straight into enemy territory, his third successor Xerxes was not prepared to take the risks of the founding generation. Xerxes prepared slowly, systematically, and in keeping with an empire whose watchwords now were stability and prudence.
Land and sea forces were to cooperate throughout the campaign, and Xerxes - or rather the administrators who planned the operation - felt it advisable to take steps against any foreseeable risk. For example, in 493 a fleet active in the northern Aegean had been shipwrecked, with heavy loss of life, off Mt. Athos (Hdt. VI 44). Determined that no such disaster should befall them again, the Persians dug a canal across the base of the peninsula so that their fleet could pass safely - without having to sail southwards along Mt. Athos’ treacherous eastern face (Hdt. VII 22-23). In addition, a bridge was built across the River Strymon which the Persian army would have to cross on its way to Greece (Hdt. VII 24). Such prudence had its downside, however, for it advertised to all in Greece that the real invasion was now imminent and gave them precious time to prepare.
In 481 BC the Greek states sent delegates to a conference on the Isthmus (Hdt. VII 172-175). Old quarrels - in particular that of Athens and Aegina - were patched up (Hdt. VII 145). Since the Persians planned to have army and fleet cooperate, so too did the Greeks. Arrangements were made for a united command under the leadership of the Lacedaemonians, both by land and by sea (Hdt. VII 148-149). The Argives refused to accept this and took no part in the defense of Greece; the Athenians, even if they were providing the bulk of the fleet, accepted a Lacedaemonian commander even by sea. This was only realistic as many states - in particular those on the Peloponnese - were already used to following “whithersoever the Lacedaemonians might lead” (see chap. 6). The Peloponnesian League already had a command structure in place for the management of a common campaign; and additional states’ introduction into this structure presented fewer difficulties than the invention of an entirely new one.
Even if the first Greek historians of the Persian Wars, and in their train Herodotus as well, relentlessly overestimated the numbers in the Persian army (see Box 10.2), there can be little doubt that the Greeks were badly outnumbered. Otherwise, the Lacedaemonian commanders would not initially have opted for a purely defensive strategy. The commanders first investigated the possibility of fending the Persians off at the Tempe Pass which led from Macedonia (already
Figure 10.4 Thermopylae today. In ancient times, the coastline lay much closer to the mountains. Source: tyler, Http://commons. wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Thermopylae_ancient _coastline_large. jpg (accessed 14 January 2013) CC BY-SA 3.0, 2.5, 2.0, 1.0
Persian) into Thessaly, but decided that holding that pass was not militarily feasible (Hdt. VII 172-173). So they left the Thessalians to shift for themselves and concentrated on the defense of the pass between northern and central Greece - Thermopylae, the “Hot Gates,” named after the hot springs in the area (see chap. 1 and Figure 10.4).
The narrowness of this pass meant that a small number of troops could hold it indefinitely against a much larger army, and it was the only route from Thessaly into central Greece which a large army could easily use. A small track - the Anopean Path - did lead around the pass, but it was easily defended and impracticable for an army to use anyway. Moreover, since fleet and land forces had to cooperate, a perfect position lay nearby for the fleet. Thermopylae lay on the Malian Gulf, part of the calm, sheltered waters to the west of the island of Euboea. The east coast of Euboea was devoid of harbors and prone to storms as was the east coast of Magnesia just to the north (see Box 1.1). A narrow strait led from the Aegean between Magnesia and Euboea towards the Malian Gulf. A small cape on northern Euboea, Artemisium, provided sufficient shelter for a fleet just to its west, a fleet which could guard the entrance to the strait (Hdt. VII 175-176). No fleet approaching from the north could find shelter,
Either off Magnesia or off Euboea, without passing Cape Artemisium. In other words, if the Persians hesitated to attack immediately - and they had hesitated at Lade (see chap. 9) -, then they would have to anchor at a place exposed to storms. The Greeks’ plan then was entirely defensive and took hardheaded advantage of the region’s topography and weather.
Early in 480 BC the Persian host, led by King Xerxes himself, crossed the Hellespont thanks to a feat of engineering which took the Greeks’ breath away - a bridge of boats, yoked together by flax and papyrus ropes (Hdt. VII 33-36). When the Persians reached Thessaly, the Thessalians submitted earth and water and joined the expedition against their fellow Greeks who had deserted them (Hdt. VII 172-174). At Thermopylae, however, the Persian juggernaut ground to a halt. The fleet came to anchor off Cape Sepias, to the north of Cape Artemisium.
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