For the most part, Rome’s territorial gains and corresponding strategic and economic advantages that resulted from the foedus of 298 were lost when Sapur II and Jovian concluded a new peace in 363.436 This time it was the Roman emperor who — in light of his crushing military defeat — had to agree to more or less all conditions for peace named by Sapur II. For Rome, losing important strategic positions and cities meant considerable loss of prestige. Many and varied sources ranging from chroniclers and historians to poets, orators and theologians reveal how Rome struggled with this situation, both historically and ideologically.437 We owe the most elaborate account to the eyewitness Ammianus Marcellinus, who was an officer in the Roman army at the time and participated in a number of wars during his lifetime.
(9) But the king insisted on demanding what, as he called it, was his and what had been taken away a long time ago by Maximianus438 but really, as the situation required, for our release439 five regions beyond the Tigris: Arzanene, Moxoene, Zab-dikene and also Rehimene and Karduene together with fifteen fortresses, Nisibis as well as Singara and the Castra Maurorum,440 a very convenient fortification. (io) And although it would have been ten times better to fight than to hand over any of these, the many flatterers put the timid emperor under pressure by bringing up the dreaded name of Procopius441 and predicting that if he, after learning of Julian’s death, returned with a fresh army, which he commanded, he would easily and without opposition overthrow the government. (ii) Without hesitation the emperor, greatly inflamed by these persistent and dangerous remarks, handed over everything they asked for442 and he barely made sure that Nisibis and Singara came under Persian control without their inhabitants and that the Romans from the fortresses that were to be handed over were allowed to return to our protection.
(12) In addition there was another dreadful and shameful condition, namely that after the conclusion of these negotiations, our longstanding and faithful friend Arsaces, if he asked for it, should not be given help against the Persians. This was designed with a double purpose, so that a man who with the emperor’s instruction had devastated Chiliocomum443 would be punished and that there would be the opportunity immediately after to invade Armenia without opposition. This is why later the same Arsaces was captured alive and the Parthians under dissensions and turmoils seized the longest stretch of Armenia,444 which borders Media, as well as Artaxata.445 (13) After this shameful peace had been sealed distinguished men were given as hostages on both sides so that nothing was done contrary to the agreement during the truce. . .
(14) Thus a peace of thirty years was concluded and sealed by sacred oaths...
The majority of ancient authors judge the treaty of 363 as one of the most unfortunate treaties that Rome ever concluded with a foreign power.446 Although Ammianus Marcellinus tends to be critical of the emperor Jovian, his account reveals a balanced view. We learn that the agreement of 363 cancelled important stipulations of the foedus of 298, which had been disadvantageous for the Sasanians. From a Roman perspective there was a clear loss of territories that had formed an integral part of the empire. Losing much of north-eastern Mesopotamia, in particular the cities Nisibis and Singara, had an immediate effect on Rome’s prestige. Ammianus Marcelli-nus describes in detail the exodus of the inhabitants of Nisibis and the take-over by the Persians.447 The urgency of his account reveals how much significance contemporaries attributed to the event and how important the city was for Roman security and trade.448
According to the wording of the treaty Nisibis and Singara had to be handed over ‘without their inhabitants’ (sine incolis), which means the cities were taken over ‘naked’ by their new rulers.449 Apparently the inhabitants of the two cities were to be spared captivity and deportation.450 Eutropius and Festus, who composed their breviaria ab urbe condita shortly after the events, describe the surrender of Nisibis as a unique event in all of Rome’s history.74
On first sight the regulation regarding the so called ‘provinces beyond the Tigris’ is ambiguous. According to Ammianus Marcellinus Sapur II obstinately demanded (petebat obstinatius) the return of the territories that had been ceded to the Romans in 298 but was not given all of these: apparently Sophanene and Ingilene remained under Roman influence.451 Although the author states that Jovian instantly complied with all demands it would appear that Sapur II eventually was prepared for concessions in 363. After Jovian’s death the Sasanians pursued an aggressive policy against Armenia, which suggests that Sapur II used the first opportunity to achieve with arms what he had not accomplished in 363 (26). The two sides failed in their attempt to come to an understanding with regard to the status of the traditional ‘bone of contention’ Armenia; the stipulation that Armenia henceforth was not to receive Western support did not bring about a long term solution to the problem.452 Sapur II adhered to what was spelled out in the treaty of 363 only as long as Jovian was alive. With the emperor’s death Persian attempts to conquer Armenia began and before the end of Sapur II’s reign an agreement was reached between the two great powers that envisaged the actual partition of Armenia. Shortly after, this was confirmed by a formal agreement.453
Our sources do not explicitly mention that the foedus of 363 targeted economic considerations or those relating to trade. However, the negotiations regarding the Mesopotamian centres of trade and the influence in Armenia have to be viewed in such a context.454 The clause that stipulated the surrender of Nisibis ‘eliminated the Roman monopoly of the income from the trans-borderia Nisibis’.79 From the Syriac chronicle of Joshua the Stylite,8° which was composed in Edessa at the beginning of the sixth century, we learn that the Sasanian king Balas (484—8) approached the Roman emperor Zeno asking him for financial support for his war against the Hephthalites. Complaining that the taxes of Nisibis granted to Persia many years before were high enough,8i the emperor refused to pay any money to Balas although his predecessor Peroz (459—84) had received such payments.82 According to Joshua the Stylite it was agreed in 363 that the Persians would take possession of Nisibis for 12° years but that the city would then be returned to its previous masters.455 This phase ended while Zeno was emperor. When the Sasanians refused to hand over the city new disputes arose. The financial loss incurred by the outstanding taxes remained an issue of contention and were at least in part responsible for the attitude of the Byzantine emperor Zeno
The so called ‘Romance of Julian’, written by a monk from Edessa and generally dubious as a historical source, contains an interesting remark in this context.456 The anonymous author states that Jovian agreed to hand over Nisibis for ioo years and that during this period no Christians were persecuted in the Sasanian Empire.457 The two Syriac sources agree that the clauses of 363 were limited to a fixed period of time. According to Ammianus Marcellinus the peace was concluded for thirty years.458 It is possible that this was intended to be a time span of ‘one generation’ and the expected lifetime of the Roman emperor Jovian, who in 363 was thirty years old; he adhered to the terms of the treaty until his death. The discussions regarding the foedus of 363 that arose during the fifth century illustrate that the time limit was not simply a diplomatic formula but that it was a real aspect of the treaty which could indeed cause problems later.
In any case, the time limit assigned a somewhat provisional character to the treaty that had been concluded between Jovian and Sapur II. Its clauses were not necessarily interpreted as binding and definitive. Given the territorial losses that Rome suffered, this must undoubtedly be regarded as a success for Jovian. It would not appear to be justified, and not even in light of the ceding of Roman territories, to talk about a ‘shameful and humiliating peace’ for Rome.88 Although Ammianus Marcellinus tries hard to criticise the Roman emperor for his wrong behaviour in the year 363, he does not fail to notice that during the peace negotiations Jovian was above all interested in securing the release of his troops (pro redemptione nostra). After Julian’s military catastrophe (8) it must indeed have been Jovian’s primary goal to see his army withdraw unharmed by Sasanian attacks.89 He was able to achieve this goal by obligating Rome in the way discussed above.
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