Athens

The Theban victory at Leuktra shocked and greatly distressed the Athenians. The Thebans had played a prominent role in the early days of the Athenian Sea League but as their power increased the Athenians had grown chary of their one-time partner against Spartan oppression (Harding 33; Diodoros 15.28). Theban behavior in more recent years - such as the razing of Plataiai in 373 - had sharpened Athenian wariness though the two cities remained allies (Diodoros 15.46.4-6; Xenophon Hellenika 6.3.1; Isokrates 4). At a peace conference at Sparta immediately before Leuktra Epameinondas had provoked Spartan ire by refusing to sign the treaty on behalf merely of the Thebans instead of the Boiotians. The Athenians had no doubt looked forward to what they expected would be a thorough - and satisfying - thrashing of the Thebans by the Spartans at Leuktra. The Thebans, on the other hand, do not seem to have developed a reciprocal mistrust. They had contemplated sending their wives and children to Athens for safety at the start of the Leuktra campaign (Diodoros 15.52.1). Immediately after the battle they sent a garlanded herald to Athens with news of their victory and an invitation to join them in taking vengeance on the Spartans. The Athenians gave no answer to the herald and even refused to grant him the customary hospitality (Xenophon Hellenika 6.4.19-20).

Thebes, not Sparta, now became the Athenians’ main worry. In the wake of Leuktra they convened a peace conference at Athens that reaffirmed once again the terms of the King’s Peace. The Thebans were not included; indeed, the treaty added a provision that required all signatories to come to the defense of one another, an Athenian attempt to involve all states in the maintenance of the Peace against continued Theban expansion (Xenophon Hellenika 6.5.1-2). Nonetheless in 370 the Euboian cities and Akarnania left the League and joined the Theban side (Xenophon Hellenika 6.5.23). In 369, the year after Epameinondas had detached Messenia from Sparta and in the face of his second invasion of the Peloponnese, the Athenians allied themselves with Sparta (Xenophon Hellenika 6.5.33-49; 7.1-14).

Sparta had implemented her hegemony through the King’s Peace (387/6) which granted her, as enforcer of the Peace, Persian political and financial backing. In return Sparta recognized Persian claims to the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Subsequently, Athens forced Sparta to share the enforcer’s role by the success of her Second Sea League and by her smashing victory over the Spartan fleet in 375 at Naxos (Xenophon Hellenika 5.4.61; Diodoros 15.34.3). In 367, having hobbled Sparta and won over a number of Athenian allies, Thebes stood ready to make her own case to the Great King to be anointed protector (prostates) of his Peace. When it became known that Sparta had sent an embassy to the King at Susa seeking aid, the other Greek states followed suit. The Theban envoy, Pelopidas, enjoyed several advantages in the negotiations. Most obvious of these was that Thebes had convincingly demonstrated her military superiority. But alone among the ambassadors from leading Greek states Pelopidas could boast of Thebes’ long history of friendship with Persia, dating back to the active assistance she had given Xerxes in 480/79. This is a striking and perhaps unique instance of a Greek publicly renouncing panhellenic ideals. Pelopidas persuaded the King to back Thebes as the enforcer of a new King’s Peace that would recognize an independent Messenia and call for the Athenians to beach their fleet (Xenophon Hellenika 7.1.33-40; Diodoros 15.76.3). The Peace was not an immediate success among the Greeks - both Athens and Sparta rejected it - but winning the King’s recognition was significant for Thebes (Diodoros 15.76.3; Buckler 2003: 327-32; Stylianou 1998: 485-9). Not long afterwards most of Sparta’s remaining allies in the Peloponnese made peace with Thebes. In addition the Great King agreed to build a fleet for Thebes (Diodoros 15.79.1; 16.40.1; Buckler 1980: 169-75). The Theban ships would both counterbalance Athenian power and deter the King’s often-restive satraps along the Aegean coast.

The focus of Athenian interest post-Leuktra was in the Aegean. A primary goal was to regain Amphipolis, which in 367 made an alliance with the Chalkidian League, a recent defection from the Athenian League (Cargill 1981: 168). Another goal was to prevent Theban expansion beyond Thessaly and Macedonia. While Sparta clearly was the Thebans’ main concern they did not entirely ignore other areas in the mainland. They had been active in the north, chiefly under Pelopidas, though he was killed in battle in 364 (Diodoros 15.80.1-6). They had intervened in Thessalian affairs, eventually isolating Alexandros the tyrant of Pherai, and taken a hand in the dynastic struggle in Macedon, stymieing Athenian ambitions in the area (Diodoros 15.67.34; Plutarch Pelopidas 26). For their part, the Athenians backed contenders for the thrones ofthe Macedonian and assorted Thracian kingdoms, assisted satraps rebelling against the Persian King, and kept a fleet operating in the region to insure the safe passage of grain ships between the Black Sea and Athens. The results of this activity were generally favorable. Timotheos wrested Samos from Persian control in 365 (Diodoros 15.9; Isokrates 15.111). He also won over Pydna, Methone, Poteidaia, and Torone (Demosthenes 4.4; Isokrates 15.113; Diodoros 15.81.6). A grateful satrap ceded Sestos, a key city in the Chersonese, in return for Athenian assistance against the Persian King (Isokrates 15.112). But in 364 Athenian interests suffered a setback when Epameinondas launched the fleet Persia had built for Thebes. There was no battle, but the presence of a rival naval power dealt a blow to Athenian prestige and encouraged a series of defections from the Athenian League, including Byzan-tion, Chios, and Rhodes (the last two probably rejoined the League soon afterwards, however).

The Athenian about-face after Leuktra called into question the anti-Spartan purpose of their League. Modern opinion is divided as to how closely the Athenians adhered to the founding principles of the League. After 371 there were few, if any, new members added. Instead, the Athenians made bilateral treaties with new allies. They did establish garrisons and settle Athenian citizens in various allied towns and territories, for example, Samos and Sestos, though perhaps not in any League member (Cargill 1981: 146-60; Harding 69; R&O 52). They also collected funds from allies, calling the exactions (if so they were) ‘‘contributions’’ (syntaxeis) instead of ‘‘tribute’’ (phoros), the old fifth-century imperial term. Again, it is not clear if these were mandatory for League members. In any case, enforced exactions and settlements on bilateral allies probably did little to inspire the confidence of the League members in Athenian intentions overall.

In 357 the Athenian commander Chares intervened in a Thracian dynastic dispute and won over the Chersonese for the Athenians (Demosthenes 23.173; Harding 64; R&O 47). The Euboian cities also returned to the League (Diodoros 16.7.2; Harding 65, 66; R&O 48, 69). But in the same year Rhodes, Chios, and other League members joined Byzantion in an open revolt against the Athenians, initiating what modern historians call the Social War (from the Latin term for allies, socii). The satrap of Karia, Maussolos, supported them with a fleet and installed garrisons on Rhodes and Chios. The rebels plundered Imbros and Lemnos and besieged Samos. Chares sailed to Samos but was defeated by the rebels early in 356. A reinforced fleet again was defeated off Embata in the territory of Erythrai (Diodoros 16.7.3-4). Short of funds, Chares entered the service of the rebellious satrap Artabazos and inflicted a major defeat on forces loyal to Persia. In response the Persian King complained to the Athenians; there was a report as well that the King was readying a fleet of 300 ships to assist the enemies of Athens. As a result the Athenians made peace with their rebellious allies in 355 (Diodoros 16.22). The causes of the Social War are unclear. Demosthenes says that Maussolos was the prime mover (Demosthenes 15.3). It may not have been difficult for the ambitious satrap to exploit League members’ discontent with the Athenians’ aggressive actions in the Chersonese and on Samos. Athenian commanders such as Chares, whose efforts to raise money amounted to little more than outright plundering, also damaged Athens’ reputation (Sealey 1993: 106-8; Cartledge 1987: 311; Cargill 1981: 161-88). Philip II would soon follow in Maussolos’ footsteps. In the event it was a defeat for the Athenians; they had to recognize the independence of key cities such as Byzantion while at the same time deferring to Persia.

In the decade after Leuktra there were ongoing hostilities in the Peloponnese involving the Spartans, Arkadians, Eleians, and other cities in a constantly changing series of alliances. The Athenians for the most part were content to play a secondary role. They sent troops to harass the various Theban invasions and were active chiefly around Korinth and the Isthmus. In 366, angry that they had received no help when the Thebans had retained the long-disputed northeastern Attic border town of Oropos, the Athenians made a defensive alliance with the Arkadians, even though the Arkadians were at war with Athens’ other key ally Sparta (Xenophon Hellenika 7.4.1-3; Diodoros 15.76.1). Also in 366, perhaps as a result of the King’s Peace Pelopidas had negotiated the year before, Korinth and Phleious made peace with Thebes (Xenophon Hellenika 7.4.6-11). Nothing was left of Sparta’s Peloponnesian League. A war between Elis and the Arkadian League led to fighting in the sanctuary at Olympia, the loss of much Eleian territory, and ultimately a split in the Arkadian League itself along democratic and oligarchic lines (Harding 56; R&O 41). The Thebans decided to invade Arkadia in 362 (Xenophon Hellenika 7.4.28.5-27). Her allies now included Tegea, Megalopolis, Messenia, Argos, and Sikyon. On the other side were Mantineia, Elis, Achaia, Sparta, and Athens. The two armies met near Mantineia and though the Thebans carried the day Epameinondas was killed. The battle of Mantineia marked the end of Theban predominance. While no longer the major player in Greek affairs, the Thebans had united Boiotia and dismantled Sparta’s power.