In the year 410, shortly after the point at which Thucydides’ work breaks off in mid-sentence, the Battle of Cyzicus took place, and it reversed fortunes in the war. The Lacedaemonians, using Persian money, had collected a fleet of approximately 120 ships which they had divided into two squadrons. One was active in the western Aegean near Euboea under the commander Agesandridas (Thuc. VIII 91), and the other in the Propontis under the overall commander Mindarus (Thuc. VIII 99). The Athenian fleet surprised this second Lacedaemonian squadron. Mindarus immediately sent a message to Agesandridas to sail into the Propontis as quickly as possible (Diod. XIII 41). The route which this squadron took led it along the coast of the northern Aegean and around Mt. Athos (see Box 1.1) where a catastrophic storm caused some fifty ships to sink. Of the crews on those ships - 10,000 in all if one assumes that each trireme’s crew was at full strength - only twelve men survived (Ephorus, BNJ 70, Fr. 199). A handful of ships made it into the Propontis (Xen. Hell. I 1,1 and 3,17), but the vast majority now lay on the bottom of the Aegean. Consequently, when the Athenians’ and the Lacedaemonians’ fleets met at Cyzicus, the latter’s was at approximately half the strength it otherwise would have had. A squadron of twenty Athenian ships under Alcibiades succeeded in tricking the Lacedaemonian commander, Mindarus, who still had eighty ships, into attacking - unaware that two additional Athenian squadrons were lying out of sight. These two squadrons came in behind the Lacedaemonian fleet as it pursued Alcibiades’ squadron; and Mindarus was beset from all sides (Diod. XIII 50; cf. Xen. Hell. I 1,16-18, with a different account). The Athenians either captured or destroyed every ship in what remained of the Lacedaemonians’ fleet (Diod. l. c.; Xen. Hell. I 1,18), and the Lacedaemonians sent an embassy to Athens to offer terms of peace on the basis of the status quo (Diod. XIII 52).
Given the losses which the Athenians had suffered in the Sicilian expedition and given the large number of revolts which they still had to suppress, they would have been well advised to accept. That they took the very poorest advice - to continue the war (Diod. XIII 53) - could suggest that in the aftermath of the great victory at Cyzicus the oligarchy of the 5,000, which in Thucydides’ opinion had brought Athens back from the brink, was replaced by the restored democracy. Granted, oligarchies had as much skill as democracies in making bad decisions, but the Athenian democracy was particularly capable in this regard - and its inability to accept terms of peace except under the direst stress will be on spectacular display later on.
In the meantime the Athenians got on with suppressing revolts throughout the empire. The revolts on Lesbos they had mostly suppressed even before the Battle of Cyzicus (Thuc. VIII 23); Eresus alone remained unconquered (Thuc. VIII 100). Theramenes reconquered Paros in 410 if Diodorus has the date right (Diod. XIII 47), while on the mainland of Asia Minor the Athenians had also recaptured Clazomenae (Thuc. VIII 23) and Cyzicus (Thuc. VIII 107). After the Battle of Cyzicus, with Alcibiades once again fighting for the Athenians, the suppression of the revolts began in earnest. The town of Colophon on the mainland of Asia Minor surrendered peaceably to the Athenian commander Thrasyllus in 409 (Xen. Hell. I 2,4). In the next year Alcibiades managed to recapture the important city of Byzantium (Diod. XIII 66-67; Xen. Hell. I 3); a consequential campaign in the Hellespont brought all the cities there with the exception of Abydus back under Athenian control (Diod. XIII 68). In 407 Thrasybulus campaigned along the Thracian coast and put down the revolts there; he also brought the large and important island of Thasos back under Athenian control (Diod. XIII 72; Xen. Hell. I 4,9). Alcibiades recaptured Andros off the southern tip of Euboea in the same year (Diod. XIII 68; Xen. Hell. I 4,22-23).
Much of the coast of Asia Minor, however, was still in revolt (Ephesus, Erythrae, Miletus) as were many islands in the Aegean (Chios, Cos, Rhodes, Euboea) and in 409 the Lacedaemonians finally recaptured Pylos (Diod. XIII 64; Xen. Hell. I 2,18). The Persians had also obligingly financed the construction of a new fleet for the Lacedaemomians and were continuing to pay the rowers in it (Xen. Hell. I 1,24-26). Notwithstanding, the war was definitely going the Athenians’ way again. The Athenian assembly, however, was unwilling to accept that in the long process of suppressing the revolts, minor setbacks were bound to occur.
In a minor battle off Cape Notium near Ephesus, a detachment of the Athenian fleet suffered such a setback. Alcibiades had left the detachment off Cape Notium to keep watch over the Lacedaemonian fleet at Ephesus while he himself went to Clazomenae. In his absence - according to standard policy - the helmsman of his ship, Antiochus, took over the command. Even though Alcibiades had given strict instructions not to engage the Lacedaemonian fleet, Antiochus did so anyway; and in the ensuing engagement the Athenians lost 22 ships (Hell. Oxy. col. IV; Diod. XIII 71; cf. Xen. Hell. I 5, 10-14). Such an
Unnecessary setback must have frustrated the Athenians, but as an isolated incident it did not signify much.
Yet the Athenian assembly made much of it anyway. Diodorus, following Ephorus who was a native Cymaean, also records an account of Alcibiades’ attack on Cyme and claims that Alcibiades’ operations in Cyme incurred additional unpopularity back home. Ephorus, ever the patriotic Cymaean, may have exaggerated a bit here, but Diodorus also mentions that various private individuals had brought lawsuits against Alcibiades. Xenophon, when discussing the affair at Notium, states that the Athenians attributed the loss to Alcibiades’ “heedlessness and want of self-control” - and he may mean roughly the same thing as that to which Diodorus refers. That is to say, the affair at Notium may have been minor, but various other episodes involving Alcibiades had preceded it; and at some point the cup ran over. When the Athenians elected their ten generals that year, Alcibiades was not among them. In a fit of pique he defected again. This time he struck out on his own in the Chersonese (Diod. XIII 73-74; Xen. Hell. I 5,16-17). An official sentence of banishment followed (Isocrates, XVI 37).
In the absence of Alcibiades - who despite all was a competent commander - the Lacedaemonians with a fleet that eventually comprised 170 ships (Diod. XIII 76 and 78; Xen. Hell. I 6,3, 17, and 26), began to make some headway under their commander Callicratidas. In 406 they surprised an Athenian detachment of seventy ships under the command of Conon off Lesbos, defeated it, captured thirty ships, and blockaded the rest in the harbor of Mytilene (Diod. XIII 77-79; Xen. Hell. I 6,16-18). On Lesbos meanwhile the Lacedaemonians captured Methymna (Diod. XIII 76; Xen. Hell. I 6,13). In this situation the Athenians made an extraordinary effort to man the largest fleet possible. Everyone - from slaves at the bottom of the social scale to wealthy aristocrats who normally served in the cavalry at the top - clambered aboard to serve as rowers (Diod. XIII 97; Xen. Hell. I 6,24).
In the end the Athenians had 150 ships. Eight of the ten generals sailed with the fleet towards Lesbos to relieve Conon. Callicratidas left behind thirty ships to continue the blockade and sailed with 140 to meet the Athenians. The two sides engaged near a group of islets to the south of Lesbos, the Arginussae. The islands precluded a single battle line; effectively, one battle became two with, for practical purposes, four fleets fighting in what for number of ships was the greatest naval battle of Greek against Greek up to that time (Diod. XIII 97-98; cf. Xen. Hell. I 6,25-33). The result was an unqualified disaster for Sparta. Callicratidas himself died, and the Lacedaemonians lost 77 ships (Diod. XIII 100; cf. Xen. Hell. I 6,34). Effectively the Lacedaemonians had managed to lose a second, Persian-financed fleet. As after the Battle of Cyzicus, the Lacedaemonians probably offered terms of peace to the Athenians. The offer is attested only at [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 34 which for the late fifth century is generally well informed, though, unfortunately, some doubt must remain in the point (on the Ath. Pol. as a source, see Box 8.1).
The Athenians too had lost ships at the Arginussae, some 25 in all. Shortly after the battle a storm had arisen, and under the circumstances the generals decided to bring the 125 other ships to safety quickly - instead of staying behind to rescue the survivors from the wrecks (Diod. XIII l. c.; Xen. Hell. I 6,34-35). Given that the Athenians could ill afford to lose ships - unlike the Lacedaemonians they had no backers with bottomless pockets to keep building ships for them -, the generals clearly made the right decision. All the same, a number of shipwrecked sailors survived the storm and came ashore alive. Upon their return to Athens, they complained bitterly about the callous generals who had left them to drown; and the Assembly wished to put the generals on trial. Chairman of the Boule on that day, and thus responsible for putting any motion to the Assembly for debate, was none other than the philosopher Socrates (Xen. Mem. I 1,18 and IV 4,2), the teacher of both Plato and Xenophon. On a legal technicality Socrates refused to put the motion (Xen. Hell. I 7, 9-15), so the Assembly waited one day ([Plat.] Ax. 368) and under a more pliant chairman passed a sentence of death on all the generals. Two had already gone into exile in anticipation of the verdict, while the other six took the proffered cup of hemlock (Diod. XIII 101-102; Xen. Hell. I 7). The Athenian Assembly had just decapitated Athens’ military leadership.
In 405 the Lacedaemonians sent out Lysander as commander. He received another generous subsidy from the Persians and set about building new ships to replace the ones lost off the Arginussae (Diod. XIII 103; Xen. Hell. II 1,10-12). As long as the Persians remained willing to finance fleet after fleet for Sparta, the Lacedaemonians could continue the fight indefinitely. If Athens, on the other hand, lost a battle on the order of magnitude of Cyzicus or Arginussae, it had no way to recover. By 405, however, Athens had with a few exceptions (in particular Conon) deprived itself of almost all competent commanders. Under the circumstances errors were likely, and a major one might easily mean the end. In the Hellespont in 405, the Athenians erred.
After a siege, Lysander captured Lampsacus from the Athenians in that year just before the Athenian fleet could arrive to relieve the town. Therefore Lysand-er’s fleet lay in a good harbor at Lampsacus. The Athenian commanders, however, brought their fleet to a place called Aegospotami opposite Lampsacus (Diod. XIII 104-105; Xen. Hell. II 1,18-21). In the absence of a harbor, the Athenians had to pull their triremes up onto the beach for the night. Bringing a trireme back into the water takes time, and during the process the trireme is hopelessly exposed to attack. Under the circumstances extraordinary watchfulness was required so that the Athenians could get their ships ready in case of attack, but the commanders, with the exception of Conon, did not understand just how much care was needed in such a risky situation.
An Athenian commander made an inadequately supported sortie with thirty triremes while the other triremes remained on the beach. Lysander, forewarned by deserters, was ready and responded with a full-scale attack, easily defeated the first thirty triremes of the Athenians, and caught most of the rest on the beach (Diod. XIII 106; cf. Xen. Hell. II 1, 27-28 with a different account).
In the end Lysander captured some 170 Athenian triremes. A few under the command of Conon, who had kept the ships under his direct command ready, managed to get away. One of them was the Paralus, one of the Athenians’ two messenger triremes, especially fast ships always kept in perfect repair. This ship Conon sent on to Athens with the terrible news while he himself with the others headed eastwards (Diod. XIII 106; Xen. Hell. II 1,29). Athens was no longer a place to which Conon wished to return; he took service with Evagoras, the king of the Greek city of Salamis on Cyprus which still stood under Persian control. A highly competent commander, Conon did well for himself first in the employ of Evagoras and then in that of the Persian king himself, Artaxerxes II, whose fleet he would eventually command (Diod. XIV 39; Xen. Hell. II 1,29 and IV 3,12).
Meanwhile, the Paralus arrived in Athens with its ill tidings. The game was up for Athens, even if the Assembly refused to acknowledge the fact. As the Lacedaemonian fleet made its way to blockade Athens by sea in addition to the blockade by land, the Athenian Assembly, at the suggestion of Cleophon (Aesch. II 76; Lys. XIII 8), passed a decree that made it a capital crime even to suggest surrendering. The Athenians stubbornly put off the inevitable until the pressure of starvation became too great (Xen. Hell. II 2,1-15). In mid-404, Theramenes, a guiding light of the 5,000 who had retained his influence even under the restored democracy and who whatever his faults maintained a firm grip on reality, eventually contrived to get the Athenians to see sense. Athens surrendered on terms and the war was over (Xen. Hell. II 2,16-24).
World History
