The presence of so many soldiers across such a wide geographical area of the empire provided opportunities and may have encouraged economic developments. In the second century ad in the Roman Empire an army of 300,000 soldiers might well consume annually about 100,000 tonnes of wheat at one kilogram of grain per person each day. With a larger army, this would have risen to 150,000 tonnes by the early third century.117 In Britain in the late second century the large complement of troops would also have needed large numbers of replacement horses and mules, and about 2000 calves a year for the replacement of leather tents and clothing, and possibly more than 2000 animals a year for religious sacrifice.118 Large supplies of animals and foodstuffs could not be obtained from the lands (prata legionis) normally attached to the camp for the use of soldiers. The soldiers would also need various kinds of meat, fruit, vegetables, oil and wine. The government normally supplied soldiers with food, clothing and weapons but made a fixed deduction from their salary to defray costs. Cavalrymen were supplied with horses at a set rate and then became responsible for their upkeep.
In the early phase after conquest the army might have to rely on imported goods for many of its needs. There is evidence for long-distance supply in the remains of wheat discovered at the legionary base at Caerleon, which contained Mediterranean weeds, suggesting import possibly from southern France.119 At the legionary base at York remains of grain pests also indicate that grain was transported at least from southern Britain; the type of grain was also different from that grown in the countryside round York.120 After the army had consolidated its position and settled down into an army of occupation, it could seek to organize local suppliers as best it could. Obviously it would be more convenient and less expensive to obtain as many supplies as possible from local sources. For example, Plautius Silvanus, governor of Moesia on the Danube under Nero around ad 60 to 67, was able to send a large amount of grain to Rome, which suggests that his army had adequate provisions in the frontier zone.121
Eventually the local economy might become fully integrated into the Roman system, so that military requirements were met by local markets and the exchange of goods, as suppliers nearby became more numerous. There was not necessarily a strict chronological development in these various stages of organizing supplies for the army.122 In any event, it is possible that in the long run the presence of the Roman army encouraged local agriculture and cattle-rearing in the vicinity of camps and forts and across the whole frontier zone. Cereal and cattle or hides could be supplied in the form of taxes in kind or compulsory purchase, but there will have been opportunities for local people to sell for profit.123 Although it remains very difficult to demonstrate that the arrival of a large army had an expansionist effect in the economy of north Britain, for example, in the development of arable production,124 nevertheless there are some indications that in Northumberland, beyond Hadrian’s Wall, grain and cattle culture increased after Roman occupation.125 It has also been suggested that the presence of large Roman forces in Germany in the early years of Augustus led to an intensification of agricultural production in Gaul and gave a boost to Gallic pottery-making. In the longer term supplying the army continued to stimulate economic activity in Gaul, as did an ordered communication system based on the Roman roads built initially to facilitate military movements and the development of centres able to exploit the new ‘commercial tides’.126 Naturally, supplying the army with foodstuffs placed an unequal burden on the provinces. The army in the Danubian provinces would rely heavily on all the Balkan provinces, while the army on the Rhine relied on Gaul, and the British garrison looked to Britain and Gaul or further afield. However, the evidence for material culture is fragmented and often chronologically imprecise, and it is impossible to quantify how the pressures of military supply intensified in time of warfare.
In the case of manufactured goods, such as arms, armour, clothing, tools, equipment, tiles, pots, metalwork and building materials, the army would naturally prefer to make as much as possible for itself. Commenting on the duties of the prefect of engineers, Vegetius said that his main responsibility was to ensure that ‘nothing that the army was thought to require should be lacking in the camp’.127 An extract from the Digest on military affairs contains a list of soldiers exempt from certain military duties, including dressers, ditchers, farriers, architects, helmsmen, shipwrights, glass-makers, smiths, arrow-makers, coppersmiths, helmet-makers, cartwrights, roof-makers, sword-makers, waterpipe-makers, trumpet-makers, horn-makers, bow-makers, plumbers, metalworkers, stone-cutters, lime-burners, wood-choppers, choppers and burners of charcoal.128 There is extensive evidence for soldiers as artisans, craftsmen and engineers, and some military camps seem to have been a hive of manufacturing activity.129 Indeed, it is possible that the legionary brickworks at Vetera (Xanten) may have turned out over one million bricks a year, and that bricks made by the legionaries could even be exchanged for other goods.130
However, the army was not self-sufficient, and the government would have to try to manage local resources and encourage local production to make up the shortfall or seek goods from further afield, either by requisition or by compulsory purchase, or by normal dealing in the marketplace. Evidence is limited, but, for example, we find Egyptian villagers in the Fayum supplying spear shafts and receiving payment from public funds.131 Similarly in ad 138 the weavers of Philadelphia in Egypt were required to produce blankets of a specified quality for the army in Cappadocia, for which they received payment in advance.132 As the army settled into a province and the local population got used to its presence, the army bases could become a great attraction for people with goods to trade or sell; indeed, goodwill on the part of local people might assist the ready availability of supplies in the immediate area. A letter to his father from Julius Apollinarius of legion III Cyrenaica based at Bostra in Arabia in ad 107 refers to merchants coming every day to the camp.133 The long-serving legion VII Gemina in Spain virtually became a provincial institution like a small town, and served as a significant market.134
If the army had to resort to the importation of supplies over long distances, this might serve to stimulate trade and produce profits for traders. Goods being transported for military use travelled tax-free, as we learn from a legal reply of Hadrian.135 The text also suggests that some goods arrived on government order, and it is likely that some traders operated with quasi-official backing. Indeed, the army issued contracts to certain traders to arrange and transport essential military supplies. A waxed tablet from Frisia, dating to the first or second century ad, records the purchase of a cow by Gargilius Secundus, with two legionary centurions acting as witnesses.136 It may be that Secundus was a contractor acting on behalf of the army. Furthermore, as we have seen, when army commanders came to build military camps, they were not necessarily influenced only by the defensive capabilities of a site or by wider strategic concerns. It is interesting that what seems to be a small fort (burgus) on the Danube was called ‘trading post’ (commercium) by contemporaries ‘because it had been constructed for that purpose’.137 Communities along the great river routes in the western provinces, the Rhone and the Rhine, are likely to have benefited from the movement of goods, and there will have been a trickle-down effect from the military economy as other goods were brought in along with military supplies. Increased trade in the wake of the army also reached frontier zones and in some cases reinforced the power of the native elites on the other side of the frontier.138 Warfare meant that the army would need even more supplies, though trade might be disrupted by military activity beyond the frontiers.
Finally, the army also brought with it a range of activities and facilities associated with a settled urban environment: piped water-supply, baths, amphitheatres, hospitals and other carefully planned buildings. Army units had the experts and manpower to design and build what they needed, although in the first instance such buildings would be for the troops’ own benefit, but there is evidence that they contributed expertise and muscle to local projects.139 For example, we hear how a soldier who was an expert in surveying was seconded by the Legate of legion III Augusta to help the town of Saldae in Mauretania to sort out a persistent problem with the construction of a tunnel for a water-pipeline.140
To sum up, soldiers were paid regularly in coins and therefore made up one of the largest groups near frontier zones with considerable potential spending power for goods and services. For example, in Numidia it is possible that the army diffused a money economy throughout the immediate region and remained as the principal source of coined money.141 It is also likely that individual soldiers would seek to supplement their rations by purchasing special items.142 However, the economic effects of the army’s presence should not be exaggerated. Soldiers were often widely dispersed and based in small groups. Even a legionary base might contain between only 5000 to 6000 men, and many could be on duty or on secondment elsewhere.143 It is likely that many soldiers would often have little or no money to spend, or spend it rapidly in the wine shop. Since much military supply was based on a command economy, the economic impact of the army may have been significant only in relatively small local areas, and much more limited in terms of a whole province. Furthermore, the impact of the army’s presence varied from province to province. For example, in Egypt, since society was already highly monetized and urbanized, the army had limited economic influence.144 In any case, any beneficial effects from the presence of Roman soldiers were accidental. The army was sent where it was first and foremost in the military interests of Rome.
World History
