Soldiers

Theodor Mommsen said this of the selection of emperors:

The assumption of the Principate, in its essential core, the Imperium, even if not an act of free self-determination on the part of the individual citizen, is nonetheless an act which, in purely legal terms, could depend either on a vote of the Senate, or on acclamation by some group of soldiers; and so, in fact, each and every man in arms had the right to make either himself, or any other, whom he chose, emperor. (Mommsen 1887/88: II.2 844)

Tacitus, on the other hand, claims that this prerogative of the military men was a ‘‘secret’’ of the imperial regime, first revealed during the civil war of 68/9 (Hist. 1.4.2). The Romans, at least in the surviving record, do not specify any possible ‘‘legal’’ role of the soldiers in such matters. Indeed, there seems to have been no fixed legal or constitutional principle in this regard. Nonetheless, there was at least a general understanding that it was not right for soldiers simply to make emperors, and that should they do so, the context was to be understood as revolt, or civil war. At the same time, as Tacitus implies, everyone seems to have admitted that the soldiers might, at any moment, put a man of their choice on the throne. Two groups of soldiers were relevant: the praetorians at Rome, and the legionary soldiers stationed on the frontiers of the empire (Campbell 1984: 365-414).

Over the course of the first century, both groups had made, or had helped to make, monarchs. And then, in the changes of 96-7, the praetorians were again involved: the prefects were apparently privy to Domitian’s murder, and the guard, as a whole, forced (or helped to force) Nerva to adopt Trajan. And of course, one can wonder if Trajan was adopted precisely because he was commander of the military force nearest to Rome; there was a rumor, during Nerva’s short reign, of a great commander in the East, who briefly toyed with the idea of military takeover (Alfoldy and Halfmann 1973; with Brennan 1990 [2000]: 46; see now, Eck 2002).

Put bluntly, the more ‘‘constitutional’’ reigns of Nerva and Trajan did not witness the disappearance of the military as a powerful factor in selecting emperors. On the other hand, the conceivable ‘‘settlement’’ of the matter of the succession developed in this period might appear also to have affected the capacity of the soldiers to raise men to the purple. For on the whole, during the reigns of the ‘‘good’’ emperors, the troops were not much involved in politics.

Trajan died as he was being transported back to Rome from the eastern frontier, where he had been on campaign against the Parthians. Aside from his wife, Plotina, and his favorite niece, Salonia Matidia, the praetorian prefect, Acilius Attianus, was on the spot in Cilicia when the emperor passed. It seems unlikely that Plotina would have sent her letter announcing Hadrian’s assumption of the purple without having consulted the guard prefect (cf. Caballos Rufino 1984: 242). It would likewise seem that the allegiance of the troops, especially those in the East, must quickly have been sought. The fact that Hadrian immediately provided the eastern soldiers with a double bonus is suggestive (HA Had. 5.7). Still, the military appears neither directly, nor actively, to have influenced the choice.

Later, as Hadrian approached his end, and Antoninus Pius took up the reins of empire, the military was completely passive. The dying prince replaced his praetorian prefect with two new men, and provincial commands were awarded to those whose loyalty appeared certain (Birley 1997: 296). In other words, the conceivable threat of military takeover seems not to have been utterly ignored. There was, however, no overt involvement of any soldiers in this transfer of power.

Things went similarly with the next succession. In early March of 161, Antoninus Pius fell ill, and realized he was about to die. Announcing that he would entrust both the Roman state and his daughter to Marcus Aurelius, Antoninus asked that a statuette of the goddess Fortune be brought to him, and then peacefully went to sleep (HA Ant. Pius 12.5-6). This all transpired in the presence of the praetorian prefects. Otherwise, no soldiers were to be seen.

Fifteen years later, however, the provincial soldiery became suddenly more active. Gaius Avidius Cassius, who had been appointed in 170 to oversee a vast section of the eastern part of the empire (his official title was rector Orientis, i. e., ‘‘Supreme Commander of the Orient’’), proclaimed himself emperor in April of 175. Initial support came from the Syrian troops, though Cassius claimed to be assuming the purple ‘‘because’’ the soldiers in Pannonia had ‘‘chosen’’ him (Dio 71.23.1). It may also be that Cassius was goaded on by Marcus’ wife, Faustina, who feared that Marcus would die, leaving her and her children at the mercy of whatever person might then grab the purple. She supposedly preferred to put a man of her own choosing on the throne first (HA Avid. Cass. 7; Dio 71.22.3). In any case, several provincial governors in the East supported Cassius, thus providing a potentially large army; there might have been a harrowing civil war, had not a couple of soldiers summarily dispatched the would-be prince (Dio 71.27.2). The ‘‘reign’’ had lasted about three months; and soldiers had determined both the rise and the fall of Avidius Cassius.

When Marcus died, Commodus peacefully ascended the throne. During his reign, however, the threat of military takeover began to loom larger. Tigidius Perennis, an Italian, was the sole praetorian prefect from 182 until 185, during which time he largely ruled the empire (Howe 1942: 65-6; Absil 1997: 184-5). It is furthermore reported that Perennis planned to put himself on the throne, and that this scheme brought on his own end (Herod. 1.9). Perhaps the more immediate cause of his demise, though, was his attempt to stamp out the last embers of a military revolt, which began when the soldiers in Britain attempted to make their commander, Priscus, emperor (on this matter see Birley 1981: 260-1). Be that as it may, in the wake of Perennis’ death, Commodus awarded himself the epithet felix, ‘‘happy, lucky’’ (HA Comm. 8.1; H. Mattingly 1940: clix). He also at some point took to keeping the children of provincial governors hostage in Rome, hoping thus to avoid usurpation by commanders on the frontiers (Herod. 3.2.4; see, however, Zimmer-mann 1999: 202). In short, Commodus trusted neither the praetorians in the capital, nor the legions on the frontiers.

With Perennis gone, one of the emperor’s palace servants effectively took control of the government during the period from 185 until 189. This was Marcus Aurelius Cleander, a slave from Phrygia in Asia Minor, who had been freed by the emperor, and had risen to be Commodus’ ‘‘Master of the Bedchamber.’’ He, however, was executed after the city populace rioted over a food shortage, supposedly Cleander’s doing (Garnsey 1988: 226). The significant point for us is that during his ascendancy (specifically in the years 187-9), Cleander held what appears to have been a unique position in the history of the imperial administration. He was known as the apugione, literally the ‘‘Master of the Dagger,’’ though this title ought probably to have implied something more like ‘‘Commander of the Imperial Bodyguard.’’ Perhaps he was direct superior to the praetorian prefects (on his official position, see now Absil 1997: 226-31). In any case, he clearly had some kind of command of troops at Rome, and, on the basis of this position, managed to control the empire for roughly two years.

Cleander’s death was followed by several rather chaotic years, culminating in Commodus’ murder. One of the prime movers of the plot was the new praetorian prefect, Quintus Aemilius Laetus, who hailed from North Africa.. As soon as Commodus died, Laetus contacted Publius Helvius Pertinax, the prefect of Rome, suggesting that he should now be emperor. Pertinax, who may have been in on the plan, after assuring himself that Commodus was indeed gone, went to the praetorian camp, announced the emperor’s death, offered a very large bonus, and was hailed as emperor (Birley 1988: 86-8).

The new reign was short (three months). Pertinax, who was much stricter with them than Commodus had been, made the praetorians uncomfortable, so that they were continually on the edge of revolt from the very beginning of his reign (Herod. 2.4.4-5). As March of 193 drew to a close, 300 guardsmen, supposedly at Laetus’ behest, decided to rid themselves of the man they quickly had come to despise, and murdered Pertinax (HA Pert. 10.8-11). There was no plan for the sequel. When he learned of the guard’s revolt, Pertinax had sent Flavius Sulpicianus, his father-in-law and the current urban prefect, to the praetorian camp to keep order. Upon the death of his son-in-law, Sulpicianus began to maneuver to have himself proclaimed emperor (Dio 74.11.1). Some of the praetorians, however, did not favor him, and sought the Senate House. There they found another candidate, Marcus Didius Julianus, whom they promptly brought forth. An auction of the empire ensued at the walls of the praetorian camp, and a final bid of 25,000 sestertii (the equivalent of five years’ pay) per soldier bought Julianus the throne. He was in such a generous mood, that he ultimately decided to award each man 30,000 sestertii (HA Did. Jul. 2.4-3.2; it may be noted that Marcus Aurelius gave each praetorian about 20,000 sestertii upon his accession, and that this was done under no compulsion - Dio 74.8.4).

Although the praetorians had reasserted their power, it would do them little good. For they would only reap the ferocious wrath of the next man to sit securely upon the throne. Septimius Severus cashiered the auctioneers at sword-point, and ordered that they never approach within 100 miles of Rome, on pain of death, telling them that they deserved to die a thousand times, given the crimes they had committed (Herod. 2.13.5-9). Nor did the man to whom they sold Rome profit from his investment. Didius Julianus survived for only two months (March 28-June 1, 193), before one of the guard murdered him. The Senate had anyhow condemned him to death. In the end, it would seem that the use of force to make an emperor was, perhaps, not ideal, but could somehow be reconciled. The brazen use of money in such matters was simply intolerable.

With such things transpiring at Rome, there was turmoil on the frontiers. News of the sale at the praetorian camp traveled fast. In short order, three different groups of soldiers, in three different places, declared three different provincial governors to be emperor. The acclamations came in the first days of April. At Carnuntum, in the middle of the empire, Severus received the call to rule. It can only have been a few days later when, at Antioch, Lucius Pescennius Niger was awarded the purple by his legions. Severus quickly offered a position as junior emperor to the governor of Britain, Decimus Clodius Albinus, who also had been nominated by his troops. Initially, Albinus accepted. This all set the stage for a series of battles between Severus, Niger, and Albinus, and their respective soldiers. The fighting would not end until Albinus was defeated and killed by Severus in early 197.

In the events of 193-7, we can observe the convergence of several trends. On the one hand, when Commodus perished without either a son or other successor designate, the military strode into the vacuum. Those soldiers best positioned geographically were the praetorians, which is why they determined the length of Pertinax’s tenure of the purple. Their subsequent auction of the throne to Julianus may have been the catalyst that brought the provincial legions once again into the fray. But jealousy may also have played a role. The praetorians who, until their dismissal by Severus, had been almost universally of Italian stock, were significantly better paid than the legionary soldiers, and enjoyed various privileges not held by the frontier troops. It may simply have been too much for the hardened legionaries to stand by and watch as a bunch of pampered slackers (in their view) profited from the abhorrent (in their view) sale of the throne. Nor, though, should the personal ambition of Septimius Severus, Clodius Albinus, or Pescennius Niger be ignored.

However all of this may be, we see that when family failed to produce the next prince, soldiers, in consort with their commanders, stepped quickly into the breach. The ‘‘secret,’’ which Tacitus claimed to have been revealed by the events of 68/9, was laid bare again in 193. In short, whether or not the soldiers possessed some constitutional right to make emperors, they were a presence to be reckoned with. Nor does that lesson seem to have been lost on the creator of the Severan dynasty. Septimius’ last words, spoken to his sons, Caracalla and Geta, were supposedly these: ‘‘Do not disagree between yourselves, give money to the soldiers, and despise everyone else’’ (Dio 76.17.4).

Giving money to the soldiers was one of the very first things Caracalla did, for he wanted them to proclaim him sole emperor. They, however, chose to force him to live, at least for the moment, with his brother Geta as co-emperor (Herod. 3.15.4-5). Once Geta was removed on December 19, 211, Caracalla could assiduously follow his father’s advice. He increased the soldier’s pay, and devoted himself principally to things military. He was nearly always on campaign, all the while living as did the legionaries themselves. And yet, he seems to have recognized the danger posed by armies to those who possessed the purple. For example, by the end of his reign, no province, hence, no provincial governor, held more than two legions (Birley 1988: 191). In other words, while his own inclinations brought him to follow his father’s advice, he also seems to have taken precautions to restrain the potential power of those same troops.

Regardless, it was at the hands of military men that Caracalla would perish. In early April 217, Caracalla decided to offer sacrifice at a shrine near Carrhae in Syria. On the

Figure 7.2a-d The Severans: (a) Septimius Severus (RICSeverus n. 308); (b) Caracalla (RIC Caracalla 191); (c) Elagabalus (RIC Elagabalus 88); (d) Alexander (KM 1991.2.693) (7.2a-c from the editor’s collection; 7.2d reproduced courtesy of the Kelsey Museum at the University of Michigan)

Way back, he was supposedly murdered by one of the soldiers accompanying him, who was in turn immediately slain by the other soldiers in the small entourage. Two days later, one of the praetorian prefects (both were taking part in the expedition) was hailed emperor. Many supposed that he had provided for the murder. Thus did Macrinus, suddenly rise to the rank of emperor (April 11, 217).

The Severan house reasserted itself just over a year later, again with support from the army. On May 16,218, the soldiers of the legio III Gallica, stationed near Emesa, proclaimed Varius Avitus Bassianus emperor. The whole thing was apparently managed by Julia Domna’s sister, Julia Maesa. But the ultimate success of the revolt depended on the willingness of troops to follow the family instead of the interloper, whose own troops began to defect, so that in about a month, Macrinus was defeated and killed.

The new emperor’s behavior rapidly enraged most every sector of Roman society. Antics such as nocturnal stints as a faux female prostitute did not go over well (Dio 79.13.2-4). There were thus various rumblings of military revolt - some even purportedly fomented by lowly private citizens, who thought themselves worthy of the purple (Dio 79.7.1-4). Julia Maesa thereupon chose another ofher grandsons to favor. This boy, Gessius Alexianus Bassianus, was made junior emperor (Caesar) in the summer of 221. Over the course of the next year, animosity between Elagabalus and Bassianus grew, until the former attempted to have his cousin murdered. The soldiers in Rome were infuriated, and, in early March of222, they slaughtered Elagabalus along with his mother. Their decapitated bodies were dragged through the city streets, the emperor’s remains were cast into the Tiber, and his mother’s corpse was dumped on a waste heap (Dio 79.20.2). Julia Maesa had again selected the emperor, and the praetorians saw to it that he came to rule. Imperator Caesar Marcus Aurelius Severus Alexander Pius Felix Augustus, as he was now styled, was 12 years old.

There was apparently one attempt at military takeover during Severus Alexander’s reign. A man called Taurinus is said to have been proclaimed emperor, but then, out of fear, to have drowned himself in the Euphrates (Epitome 24.2). The rule of the last Severan came to a violent end. Alexander, along with his mother, had gone north to fend off attacks by the Germans. The imperial train was at Mogontiacum (modern Mainz), when Alexander decided to negotiate with the enemy, rather than to fight. This enraged the young recruits, who mutinied, murdered the emperor and his mother, and put their own commanding officer on the throne. Thus did Gaius Julius Verus Maximinus come to the throne.

But something new had now happened. Maximinus was not born to an aristocratic, senatorial family - indeed, he came not even from an equestrian family. Nor was he from one of the more civilized portions of the Empire. Rather, he is said to have been the son of peasants who resided in Thrace. He had worked his way up through the ranks of the army, largely by means of his great size and utter ferocity. In short, Maximinus the Thracian was not only made emperor by the army, he was himself an army man through and through. The soldiers had picked one of their own, and as a result of their choice, that man became simultaneously senator and emperor (Potter, ch. 8, this volume).