Ptolemaic interests outside Egypt were not confined to Syro-Palestine, and particularly in the third century bc kings of Egypt also ruled possessions in Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. Many of these territories had Ptolemaic garrisons, documented in (particularly) epigraphic sources. Notable among these garrisoned territories were Cyprus, with a Ptolemaic strategos commanding naval and land forces, and Thera in the Aegean, whose garrison is particularly well documented (Bagnall 1976: 38-57; 123-34; Van’t Dack 1988a; 1988b). The troops based at Thera typically were drawn from southern Asia Minor (Bagnall 1976: 127), as mercenaries or regulars (the distinction is not always clear).
In order to maintain these overseas possessions (and also to patrol the Nile) the Ptolemies retained a substantial navy (Van’t Dack 1977: 95-103). The Alexandrian poet Theokritos (17.86-92; admittedly a somewhat prejudiced source) praised Egypt’s ships and Ptolemy Il’s control of land, sea, and river. Like other Hellenistic kingdoms, Egypt ultimately participated in a late fourth century ‘‘arms race’’ to construct larger warships, the triremes of the Classical Greek world being supplemented and replaced by ships known as ‘‘fours,’’ ‘‘fives,’’ ‘‘sixes’’ and so on, up to ‘‘tens’’ (on a regular basis at least), the names deriving from the number of rowers on each oar (de Souza 2007a; 2007b).
However, at the naval battle off Salamis (Cyprus) in 306 bc, Demetrios, Ptolemy I’s opponent, appears to have had larger ships than the Egyptians. Diodoros (20.49-52), providing the most detailed account of a Ptolemaic naval battle, records that Ptolemy had 140 ships in the battle itself, all ‘‘fives’’ and ‘‘fours,’’ with another 60 blockaded in Salamis. Demetrios’ fleet, perhaps somewhat smaller in numbers, nevertheless included a number of‘‘sevens’’ and ‘‘sixes.’’ The battle itself had some similarities to a contemporary land battle, with the centers fixing one another and each leader strengthening his left flank in an attempt to make a decisive breakthrough. Each left flank routed the opposing right, but Demetrios was more effective in exploiting the breakthrough to strike the Egyptian center, and so Ptolemy was defeated and withdrew. While each fleet’s tactics included ramming, the extensive use of artillery, lighter missile weapons, and boarding tactics recorded by Diodoros emphasize further similarities to contemporary land warfare.
Given the cost of building ships with imported timber and the number of rowers required (recruited from the Aegean, Asia Minor, and Phoenicia, as well as Egypt itself), a fleet of this size was a major undertaking. As Egyptian control of overseas territories diminished through the third century bc and later, the fleet diminished in importance (Van’t Dack 1977: 100-3). However, even at the time of Caesar’s war against Pompey and the subsequent Alexandrian War Egypt was a significant naval power, able to equip and man large numbers of ships (Van’t Dack 1977: 102-3, with refs.). Plutarch (Antony 56.1) records that Kleopatra VII provided 200 ships for Antony’s fleet at Actium in 31 bc, although these included cargo ships.
World History
