Cicero’s main work on oratory, the De Oratore, dates to 55 bce, a period marked by both political and personal troubles in the author’s life. About halfway through the fictional dialogue, which is imagined to have taken place in the year 91 between some of the most distinguished orators of the time, Cicero makes space for an extensive excursus (2.216-90) on the use of humor and jokes in oratory. The inclusion of this subject in a treatise on rhetoric - at least on this scale - is to be considered one of Cicero’s innovative contributions to the theory of oratory. (His emphasis on the necessity for the orator of a knowledge of civil law at 1.166-203 is another one; both innovations are ‘‘announced’’ together at 1.17-18 and 1.159.) As one of the characters says, the discussion would be incomplete without such a consideration of humor (2.233). That we are actually dealing with an excursus is stated in so many words in the text itself, where the passage is twice (2.234 and 2.290) designated as a diversorium, a ‘‘stopping place.’’ It is also underscored by Cicero’s choice of speaker. Whereas the lion’s share of the dialogue is assigned to the two orators Lucius Licinius Crassus and Marcus Antonius, the main speaker in the section on humor is Gaius lulius Caesar Strabo, a politician somewhat younger in age than Crassus and Antonius who was considered the witty orator par excellence (at least according to Cicero at Brut. 177 and Off. 1.108, 1.133; other sources are lacking). There is, however, no evidence that he wrote a treatise on humor (as Viljamaa 1994: 85 states; cf. Arndt 1904: 40). On the other hand, it is doubtful whether Cicero really set great store in his choice of speaker, considering his curious mistake in the letter from 50 bce already mentioned (Fam. 7.32.2), in which he refers to Antonius as the speaker of the excursus. Be that as it may, Zinn (1960: 43) may well be right in his suggestion that the choice of lulius Caesar Strabo was influenced partly by Cicero’s wish to pay homage to his contemporary, Gaius Iulius Caesar, the future dictator.
The excursus fits in organically with the treatment of ethos and pathos that Antonius presents as part of inventio (De Or. 2.178-216), in that humor is likewise an ‘‘irrational’’ means of persuasion; Antonius, however, who introduces the subject, does not explicitly link the excursus with what has preceded. What one of the discussion’s first examples, taken from Crassus’ oration against Marcus lunius Brutus, does show is that both pathos and humor are effective ways of defeating an adversary (2.225). Gorgias (quoted by Aristotle, Rh. 3.18.7) had already recommended countering an adversary’s seriousness by means of laughter, and vice versa. As far as we know - the sources are fragmentary - this positioning of humor after discussion of the affectus was not an entirely obvious one (Wisse 1989: 305-12): earlier authors had discussed the phenomenon in connection with the prologue (see Rhet. Her. 1.10, which gives a list of eighteen categories; Cic. Inv. Rhet. 1.25, who provides no more than a short indication); later ( Orat. 87-9, written in 46 bce) Cicero will choose yet another place (part of his treatment of the genus tenue). Quintilian (Inst. 6.3) essentially follows De Oratore (see Kroll 1934c: 341-3), although he discusses the affectus after the partes orationis and not, as is the case in Cicero, as part of the means of persuasion.
Caesar replies to Antonius’ invitation with what seems to be a polite refusal: humor is a subject that cannot possibly be discussed in a humorous way, as earlier attempts by Greek authors show. In order to elucidate this point of view Caesar (De Or. 2.218) divides the phenomenon humor ( facetiae) into two categories, namely cavillatio and dicacitas. By the former he designates the humorous tone that is consistently applied in longer passages, by the latter that which we would call a joke or witticism, a short, witty remark. (A similar division with slightly different terminology, namely sales divided into facetiae and dicacitas, is given at Orat. 87.) The terminology is said to date back to the veteres (‘‘ancients’’). This remark has often been misunderstood and has occasioned much needless speculation. Many scholars since Arndt (1904: 26 n2) have looked in vain for a Greek origin of this dichotomy. Cicero, however, uses these native Roman terms here with no other aim than to show that no ‘‘theory’’ of the laughable can be devised. In neither of the two fields is a theory useful or thinkable, Caesar says. With this observation the conversation seems to have arrived at an impasse. Antonius, however, notes that Caesar has in fact given at least one, albeit negative, rule - the very rule that Cicero’s adversaries accused him of breaking so frequently: not to crack jokes at inappropriate times, because to do so harms the orator’s gravitas (‘‘dignity,’’ De Or. 2.229). Subsequently Crassus has to step in; by repeating the point of view that dominates the entire dialogue De Oratore, he makes a theoretical discourse on humor possible. He points out that rhetoric as such is not an exact science; rather, we are dealing with observations that can serve as a frame of reference (2.232; cf. esp. 1.109).
The road is thus clear for Caesar to oblige the company with his discussion. After what has preceded, the apparently systematic way in which he proceeds comes as a surprise. Following the approach adopted by real textbooks (see the examples in Fuhrmann 1960: 160 n5), he deals with his subject by means of five questions: (1) What is laughter? (2) Whence does it arise? (3) Is it appropriate for the orator to arouse laughter? (4) To what extent? and (5) What are the categories of the laughable? (De Or. 2.235). In this respect his approach is in marked contrast with the general tenor of De Oratore, in which its distance from the ordinary textbooks is stressed time and again.
These five questions provide the framework for the remainder of the excursus. The treatment of the first three, however, is relatively brief. While the question as to the nature oflaughter is elaborated in the form ofvarious further questions (e. g., how is it roused, where is it found, how does it comes into being and how does it erupt so suddenly that we are unable to stop it?), the actual answer is omitted as irrelevant. A reference to Democritus, the ‘‘laughing philosopher,’’ is supposed to suffice (De Or.
2.235) . (On the ‘‘laughing philosopher’’ motif, see most recently Rutten 1992: 8-14; it is not certain, however, how familiar it was to Cicero himself.) The second question, too, is very briefly dealt with. The seat (we would perhaps rather say the ‘‘source’’) of the laughable is found in a certain dishonorableness and ugliness. For laughter arises in particular when something dishonorable is exposed in a not dishonorable way (De Or.
2.236) . This statement is almost certainly an echo of Aristotle’s famous definition of comedy: to yap yeXoEov iariv ap-dpr-qp-a ri Ka'i aiayos drwSvror Ka'i ov (pdapriKov (‘‘the laughable consists in some defect or ugliness which is not painful or destructive,’’ Poet. 5.2). It is worth noting, however, that Caesar does not mention Aristotle’s name in this context (or anywhere else in the excursus).
The third question is answered at a little more length and with some emphasis. To arouse laughter indeed befits the orator. The reasons why are manifold: laughter secures him benevolence and admiration; it defeats the opponent; it leaves the audience with a good impression; and, above all, it takes away seriousness and sternness, and refutes things that cannot easily be disproved by means of actual arguments (De Or. 2.236). Here we can see that Cicero has established a connection between the doctrine oflaughter and that of the emotions: he describes the arousal of laughter in terms that show an effect similar to that of ethos; and laughter is also a means of combating the emotions that an adversary has aroused.
Cicero has Caesar dwell much longer upon the answer to the fourth question: to what extent (quatenus) may the orator use humor? (The importance of this issue has already been touched upon in De Or. 2.221.) We should take a closer look at the organization of this section, for at first sight it is far from clear where the treatment of the fourth question ends and where the discussion of the fifth question, that of the genera ridiculi, begins. Pinkster (1995: 249-53, followed by May and Wisse 2001: 187 n207) has rightly pointed out that the treatment of the quatenus question takes up the entire section 2.237-47, not just paragraphs 237-9 (contra Leeman et al.
1989: 177-80). In other words, Caesar does not switch until 2.248 to the treatment of the fifth and last question, that of the categories (genera) of humor. The dichotomy found in 2.239 only serves as an illustration of the quatenus discussion and is comparable to the function of the division found in 2.218.
Cicero emphasizes that staying within the right bounds is of foremost importance when making witty remarks, both with regard to the subject matter and the orator’s own character. As we shall see later, the rules governing such comments derive from practical rather than ethical concerns. Two extremes are unfit as a subject for mirth: great wickedness, because in this case the audience wants to see more serious rhetorical devices employed; and great misery, because here pity is called for instead. In the third place one should beware of ridiculing people who are widely respected and beloved (De Or. 2.238). Also when holding up physical defects to mockery the orator has to observe moderation. Someone trying to be funny too often is like a mime-actor; someone passing the limits of decency is like a scurra (‘‘buffoon,’’ 2.239). Caesar illustrates both points with examples (2.240-7).
Finally comes the treatment of the fifth and last question, that of the categories of the laughable. Cicero gives the main division in De Oratore 2.248: a humorous remark either depends on content (res) or on words (verbum); the combination of both, however, is the most successful. The difference is explained in 2.252: if something remains funny when the words are changed, the joke is founded on content; if, however, changing the wording removes the joke, we are dealing with a joke based on words. Two further preliminary points are discussed at this point: (1) the ‘‘commonplaces’’ are the same in the case of humorous remarks as in the case of serious statements; sometimes even the words can be identical (2.248-50); and (2) not everything that is funny is also witty (2.251-2; this is a point that would seem better treated under the fourth question).
Caesar now proceeds to discuss the first main class, jokes depending on words, which he divides into ten categories (2.253-63): the use of ambiguity (which, he remarks, usually arouses more admiration than laughter; it is therefore good to combine ambiguity with another kind of joke, such as an unexpected remark); paronomasia; interpretation of a name; insertion of a line of verse; proverbs; taking something literally rather than according to the speaker’s intention; allegory; metaphor; irony; and antithesis. All these categories are illustrated by one or more examples, an approach that contributes greatly to the liveliness of the whole discussion.
When proceeding to the jokes depending on content (2.264-87), Caesar remarks that people laugh more readily at jokes from this class than at those depending on words (cf. Cic. Brut. 141, Orat. 136 on the greater effect of figures of thought as compared to figures of speech). Furthermore the number of categories is higher here (in total twenty-three are mentioned, some again divided into subcategories; we are told at De Oratore 2.289 that this number could easily be increased). Nevertheless, as Caesar remarks, they can all be subsumed under a restricted number of categories, which he enumerates at the end of his discourse (2.289): deceived expectation; ridiculing someone else’s character; making oneself look ridiculous; comparison with something that is uglier; irony (to be distinguished from irony as a category of humor depending on words, discussed earlier); semi-absurd remarks; and the censure of stupidity. It is difficult to classify all of the twenty-three categories mentioned earlier according to these seven main categories, if only because Caesar does not illustrate these seven categories with examples.
The main organization of the excursus on wit and jokes is thus clear; nevertheless, closer attention should be paid to some details. It must be said that Cicero has not made things easy for his readers by giving as many as four partitions of the classes of jokes (De Or. 2.218, 239, 248, 252; cf. the summary in 2.289), without making it entirely clear what their functions are or how they are interrelated. As we have seen, Caesar starts his argument by distinguishing between two categories of humor, cavillatio and dicacitas (2.218). A little later, he draws a different distinction, identifying two types of wit, one based on content (re), the other on words (dicto, 2.239). In fact, as his comments at 2.243-4 show, these two classifications correspond with each other fairly closely. Wit based on content is said to be especially appropriate to continuous irony (perpetuarum facetiarum) - a phrase that comes close in meaning to cavillatio; and wit based on words is well suited to a pointed style of expression - similar to that designated by dicacitas (see Pinkster 1995: 251). Finally, at 2.248 and 252 Caesar offers a more general classification of humor using the terminology in re (humor based on content) and in verbo (based on words). The phrasing here confusingly suggests a link to the earlier classifications - but Cicero in this case seems to have a much broader conception of humor in mind, one that is not concerned with the narrower distinction between cavillatio and dicacitas.
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