If one reads early works on ancient Near Eastern religion one often finds rather ‘‘black and white’’ descriptions of ancient belief systems. Typically, one finds monotheism, the belief in and worship of one god, starkly contrasted with polytheism, the belief in and worship of many gods. Representing monotheism, of course, was ancient Israel. Representing polytheism was essentially every other culture of antiquity. In addition, polytheism and monotheism often were portrayed as existing in an evolutionary relationship to one another, with monotheism (hence also Judaism and eventually Christianity) representing the rather unique end of the line and, consequently, the more morally and ethically advanced of the two systems.
Recent decades, however, have seen major changes in the way scholars think about ancient Near Eastern religions. Ancient Israel, for one, is now seen as a largely polytheistic society (Zevit 2001), whose early religious history was marked by mon-olatry, the worship of one god, but belief in the existence of many (Rendsburg 1995). Only during and after the Babylonian exile (586 BC) did a small circle of Judahite elites maintain absolute monotheism, perhaps under the influence of Zoroastrianism. Moreover, as we now know, pre-exilic Israelite religions also were influenced by Syro-Canaanite and Assyrian traditions (Mullen 1980; M. Smith 1990, 2001, 2003; Stern 2003). Early efforts to account for Israelite monotheism by attributing it to the influence of the Egyptian pharaoh Akhenaten (Freud 1939) have, for the most part, been abandoned.
Our understanding of Egyptian and Mesopotamian polytheism also has become more sophisticated (Hornung 1971; Lambert 1975). Far from defining these belief systems merely as the worship of many gods, scholars are now referring to them as types of‘‘complex polytheism’’ or henotheism, in which many (even all) gods can be contained in, conceived as, or represented by a single god. Often this god is believed to be the creator of the others and stands at the top of a well-developed hierarchy. But this is not always the case. In Egypt, for example, the word ‘‘god’’ in the abstract (ntr) could refer to any god that one was addressing at a particular time, and that god, regardless of his or her rank in the pantheon, could simultaneously stand in for others invoked by the supplicant. In essence, a god could be one thing and also another. Gods also could be represented in multiple ways (e. g., anthropomorphically zoomorphically, or symbolically) without theological compromise. Thus Thoth, the patron god of the scribes and ‘‘magic,’’ could be represented as a human figure with the head of an ibis or as a divine baboon even if it was believed that he had mortal origins (Hodge 2004). In addition, throughout the Near East ancients made no distinction between a god and the physical properties or phenomena that a god embodied (e. g., sun, moon, wind).
These aspects of Near Eastern polytheism/henotheism complicate the way we think about the westward diffusion of Near Eastern cults precisely because they raise questions of taxonomy. Again, the topic of interpretatio illustrates this well. What does it mean, for example, for Hellenes in Egypt to equate Zeus with Amun, and not with Re, when Amun in his native system can represent the cultic and local manifestation of Re and/or all other Egyptian gods? Did Hellenes know this or did they posit their equations based solely on a superficial understanding of the Amun cult? And if the understanding is superficial, then the process of interpretatio can hardly represent the actual cultic practices of Hellenes on foreign soil. If they were aware of the subtleties of indigenous forms of worship, then what does this tell us about the nature of their own belief system(s)? In what ways were the differences between hellenistic polytheism and Egyptian henotheism mediated? Some have attempted to contextualize the process of interpretatio by suggesting that the hellenistic period was a time in which individual gods and goddesses were being increasingly relegated to relativistic notions of the universality of divinity. The late antique development of a belief in a universal Highest Being (Greek hypsistos) who embodies all other gods (native and foreign) is sometimes seen as having stemmed from the practice of interpretatio, and to be sure the name by which one calls a god appears to have been irrelevant to some Greeks and Romans (Assmann 2004:27). Some have understood the belief in a Highest Being as a move towards monotheism (Mikalson 2005:202). Others have suggested that it tallies with attempts to create greater political unity (Fowden 1993). Nevertheless, the developmental relationship between hypsistos and interpretatio is by no means certain, and it remains to be articulated how a belief in a hypsistos differs from the various henotheistic systems of the ancient Near East.
If the process of interpretatio (or perhaps the contemporary study of it) obscures anything, it is the fact that not all polytheistic/henotheistic systems are the same. In some cases the differences may be as profound as those that distinguish one contemporary form of monotheism from another. Even a religious system like Zoroastrianism, which is often labeled ‘‘dualist,’’ defies our ability to apply this label consistently. Its sacred texts (the Avestas) may be read as supporting monotheism, dualism, and even polytheism (Stausberg 2004:204).
Moreover, each of the gods in any polytheistic or henotheistic system exists not in a vacuum, but in an ongoing dialectical relationship to the larger pantheon. The gods’ relationships to one another in part define them. In the Near East these relationships are primarily kinship-based (i. e., gods are fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, sons, daughters), but they are not all identical in every locale. The goddesses of Anatolia, for example, appear to have enjoyed equal status with gods. Thus the Hittites often addressed their prayers to the daughters of gods who were expected to intercede on their behalf (Hoffner 1995:566-77). In addition, divine kinship relations are contextualized by social structures that mirror the political systems in which the religions exist, whether monarchies (Israel, Mesopotamia, Anatolia) or democracies (Athens). Nevertheless, some social structures, such as the divine assembly, appear in different political systems (Ugarit, Mesopotamia, Athens). Until scholars factor into their comparisons the subtle differences that exist between ancient polytheisms/henothe-isms, our ability to ascertain what preconditions enabled any hellenistic ‘‘translation’’ will remain limited.
‘‘Greek religion and the ancient Near East’’ is a complex subject. While classicists and scholars of the Near East have already shed an incredible amount of light on the subject, future researchers are still left with many puzzles to solve. Our inability to define the relationship between myths and rituals makes it difficult to determine its relative value for the comparative study of Near Eastern and Aegean religions. The difficulties in establishing the exact vehicles for the exchange of religious ideas, especially as one moves into the more remote past, provide little more than plausible models for transmission. Further, the ever-growing list of parallels between Aegean and Near Eastern texts and religious practices only underscores the need to establish what shared taxonomies and conditions made their transmission possible. Moreover, the complex and often subtle differences that distinguish one polytheistic or henothe-ist religion from another make such an investigation far more difficult. The four problems surveyed above only scratch the surface when it comes to the difficulties that confront scholars engaged in the comparative study of ancient Mediterranean religions. Nevertheless, it is in grappling with such challenges that scholarship moves forward. Indeed, as archaeologists continue to unearth new finds and as textual research on the topic continues, we shall be in a better position to tackle such challenges, especially if we do so with interdisciplinary dialogue and goals.
GUIDE TO FURTHER READING
For general discussions of this subject, see Adkins and Adkins 1996, Black and Green 1992, Hallo and Younger 1997-2002, Keel and Uehlinger 1998, Toorn, Horst, and Becking 1999. For Anatolia see D. P. Wright 2004a; for Egypt, Assmann 2004, Hornung 1971, Kakosy 1995, Velde 2003; for Israel, Collins 2004, Niditch 1997; for Syro-Canaan, Caquot 1980, Toorn 1995, D. P. Wright 2004b; for Mesopotamia, Beaulieu 2004, Bottdro 1992, 2001, Lambert 1968, 1975, Livingstone 1997, Wiggermann 1995.
World History
