From Issus to the Decision at Gaugamela

Fortunately for Alexander, Darius III spared him the need to make a decision one way or the other. Darius himself led out an army to crush Alexander, withdrawing resources from his fleet in the Aegean for the expedition (Arr. Anab. II 2,1). He thus hobbled a promising counter-offensive in the far west and delivered to Alexander an opportunity to show the world that he could meet the Great King in the field and win.

Before the battle Darius actually managed to outmaneuver Alexander. Through disinformation Darius made Alexander think that he was about to enter the Cilician Plain from Syria through the southern of two passes across the intervening mountains, the so-called Assyrian Gates. Alexander marched southwards into the tapering section of the plain (Arr. Anab. II 6,1-2), between the Mediterranean and the Lebanon range, in order to meet Darius there, but Darius instead entered the Cilician Plain through the northern pass, the so-called Amanic Gates, and marched southwards behind Alexander (Arr. Anab. II 7,1). The lack of any guard on the Amanic Gates casts the colossal failure of Alexander’s intelligence into even starker relief.

Nonetheless, on the field itself Alexander prevailed. The narrowness of the battlefield worked against Darius who could not bring much of his army into the actual battle; nor could his cavalry ride around Alexander’s army (on the Macedonian left) because the field was not wide enough with the Mediterranean on one side and the Lebanon range on the other. Even so, the result was not a foregone conclusion. Greek mercenary hoplites in the Persian center came close to exploiting a gap in the center of the Macedonian phalanx. But on the

Macedonians’ right, Alexander with the Macedonian cavalry (the so-called “Companions”) broke through the Persian ranks; and then with the rest of his right wing he turned leftwards against the Persian center even as the Macedonian center regained coherence and moved forwards.

The result was a rout of the Persians’ army. Darius fled (Arr. Anab. II 8-11). The counter-offensive ended completely (Arr. Anab. II 13,5-6), and Alexander’s lieutenants in Asia Minor made good any losses (Curt. IV 1,34-35 and 5,13-18). After Issus, Darius withdrew to the Empire’s heartland, where he waited and made extensive preparations for Alexander’s inevitable march into Mesopotamia.

Alexander meanwhile appointed the Macedonian Meno as satrap of Syria (Arr. Anab. II 13,7), and moved southwards into Phoenicia. The Phoenicians had hitherto refused to break faith with Darius without a clear sign that Alexander might prevail against him. With Issus they received their sign. One by one the cities of Phoenicia, with the exception of Tyre, surrendered (Arr. Anab. II 13,7-8; 16,6). What happened next demonstrates why Alexander had declined to enter Phoenicia without a sign that he might win: it took Alexander seven months to take Tyre by siege (Diod. XVII 46; Plut. Alex. 24; Curt. IV 4,19). A dozen such sieges would have ground Alexander and his army to powder. As it was, Tyre just delayed Alexander on his march to Egypt.

After Tyre, Alexander continued his southwards march. Batis, the garrison commander at Gaza on the Egyptian border, decided to resist and succeeded in holding Alexander up for an additional two months (Josephus, Ant. XI 8,4 [325]). Then Alexander entered Egypt, which Artaxerxes III Ochus had reconquered a decade earlier after some six decades of independence. Egypt was not reliably pacified, and its satrap had no choice but to surrender.

After founding Alexandria (the most successful of the cities bearing his name) (Arr. Anab. III 1), Alexander visited the oracle of the Egyptian god Ammon at Siwah in the desert to the west of the Nile (Arr. Anab. III 3-4). Although an Egyptian sanctuary, at the time it had more importance in the Greek world. Most of its visitors came through the old Greek colony of Cyrene (see chap. 5) to consult a god whom the Greeks identified as Zeus (e. g., Pind. Pyth. IV 28 or Hdt. II 42). Mythological heroes such as Perseus and Heracles had also consulted Zeus here (Callisthenes, BNJ 124, Fr. 14). When Alexander went to Siwah, he did so as a sign to Greeks. According to Callisthenes (l. c.), at the time Alexander’s official historian (Arr. Anab. IV 10,2; Just. XII 6,17), the priest at Siwah expressly stated that Alexander was a son of Zeus (see also chap. 20). This was one of a series of flattering oracular pronouncements about Alexander which, procured at this juncture, were aimed at burnishing his image in Greek eyes.

Simultaneously, the oracle of the Branchidae, near Miletus, which had lain dumb since the Persian Wars, found its voice again and broadcast oracles concerning Alexander’s birth and coming triumphs. Good things come in threes, and a woman in Erythrae, where long ago a sybil had supposedly dwelled, claimed to be that sybil, risen anew, and made prophecies in Alexander’s favor (Callisthenes, l. c.). All three prophetic incidents belong together, and Cal-listhenes in his character as propagandist indeed reported all three together for the benefit of Greek readers. A revolt against the Macedonians had either begun or was threatening to begin in Greece (see below), hence Alexander’s wish for a burst of positive publicity in Greece.

None of this has anything to do with the Egyptians, even if Alexander’s new divine sonship does admit of an interpretation in an Egyptian context. The Pharaoh of Egypt, while alive, was traditionally considered a son of Ammon (i. e., “Zeus” to the Greeks), and an Egyptian priest, in respect of Alexander’s conquest of Egypt, might have accorded to Alexander all ranks and titles due to a legitimate pharaoh. Alexander later on presented himself as the legitimate Pharaoh in an inscription in a shrine at Karnak (P. Barguet, Recherches d’Archaeologie, d'Philologie et d'Histoire 21, 1962, pp. 194-195), and he may have welcomed the priest’s address. In fact, Alexander was never officially invested as Pharaoh - only the so-called Alexander Romance, recension a, I 34, makes this assertion, and this fantastical text of uncertain date (it was in existence by the third century AD) has no claim to historical accuracy. Granted, the Alexander Romance probably arose in Egypt, so it could attest a native Egyptian view which arose after the fact - cf. the Persian version of the Alexander Romance below.

After returning from Siwah to Memphis Alexander made detailed arrangements for dividing up the administration of Egypt among several men (Arr. Anab. III 5); but one of them, Cleomenes, who received the task of managing the finances, later took over the entire government (Arr. Anab. VII 23). Alexander left Egypt in the spring of 331 and retraced his path northwards into Syria.

There, in a radical departure from Persian administrative practice, he set up a financial hierarchy. He appointed Philoxenus to be in charge of the revenues from Asia west of the Taurus. Coeranus, meanwhile, assumed a similar position in Phoenicia (i. e., Syria) and, although Arrian does not mention it, presumably Cilicia. Harpalus, as chief treasurer, oversaw Philoxenus and Coeranus and, apparently, Cleomenes in Egypt though Arrian does not add this (Arr. Anab. III 6,4). Alexander then turned eastwards, crossing the River Euphrates at Thapsacus. He continued in this direction until he crossed the River Tigris. Here, at a place called Gaugamela, Darius III had chosen to fight (Arr. Anab. III 6-8).

Darius III had learned from his mistakes at Issus. This time he had selected a broad plain which he had in advance scoured of obstacles which might have obstructed his cavalry (Arr. Anab. III 8,7; Curt. IV 9,10). Here he could make his line as long as he wanted, and his cavalry would have every opportunity to ride around the Macedonians. On his field of choice Darius simply waited for his opponent.

Alexander, for his part, drew up an ingenious plan. At an angle to the Persians’ line the Macedonian phalanx advanced with its right wing thrust forward and its left, commanded by Parmenio, pulled back. This invited the Persians to outflank him on his right (their left). Darius III noted this and obligingly shifted troops leftwards (from his perspective). During the battle the Persian cavalry strove to ride around Alexander’s right wing; some of Alexander’s mercenary and allied cavalry units rode to block them. Meanwhile the Macedonian cavalry, with Alexander at its head, remained beside the advanced right wing of infantry. In the Persian lines opposite, as Alexander had hoped, Darius kept shifting units leftwards so as to outflank Alexander’s perilously exposed right and during these shifts, a gap opened in the Persians’ line. Into this gap Alexander led the Macedonian cavalry which then bore leftwards (from Alexander’s perspective) towards the Persian centre where Darius himself stood. Alexander outflanked the Persians in the center of their line, not, as convention would dictate, on a wing. The Persian center collapsed under this assault, and once again Darius fled (Arr. Anab. III 13-14,3).

Here, at this point, even if no participant could have known, the issue was decided. The Persian cavalry was undefeated; the Persian right (as it turned out) on the brink of victory (Arr. Anab. III 14,6-15,1); and the Persian left had not even joined battle. But the center had not held and Darius had fled. Alexander had won, and neither Darius III nor anyone else would prove able to rally an army for a third battle. Gaugamela was decisive.

With minor qualifications of the academic sort, the Persian Empire passed whole into Alexander’s hands. It had stood, once Egypt is removed from the picture, with approximately the same borders for over two hundred years - stable, prosperous, and quietly governed. In the rare cases of popular revolt (for example, in Ionia at the end of the sixth century - see chap. 9) the Persians had sought to address the cause of the revolt; in Ionia certainly with ultimate success. What few problems had arisen with satraps’ revolts in the fourth century Artaxerxes III Ochus had systematically addressed and solved. Alexander’s conquest did not impinge on the Empire’s political unity or administrative stability, and to the vast majority of its subjects, whether a Persian or a Macedonian king happened to be ruling did not matter. People paid their taxes and went about their daily lives.

In fact, from a certain point of view, Alexander’s conquest might as well have been the successful internal revolt of a frustrated prince such as Cyrus the Younger. One or two battles, and the king changed. The later tradition in Iran actually did take this view: in Ferdowsi’s eleventh-century AD epic, the Shahnameh (“Book of Kings”), Sekandar (=Alexander) is just a half-brother to Dara (=Darius III), whom he replaces on the throne after a revolt. This presentation dervives, however indirectly, from a version of the so-called Alexander Romance which survives in Syriac, but which was originally written in Persian.