Invective, according to the definition provided by Koster (1980: 38-9, 354), is a literary genre whose goal is to denigrate publicly a known individual against the background of ethical societal preconceptions, to the end of isolating him or her from the community. In the Latin rhetorical tradition, vituperatio (‘‘invective’’), together with its opposite laus (‘‘praise’’), belongs to the principal topics that make up the genus demonstrativum, or epideictic oratory. A brief discussion of this genus can be found in Cicero’s youthful work De Inventione (2.177-8) and in the almost contemporary treatise Rhetorica ad Herennium (3.10-15). The latter presents a more extensive treatment of the three broad categories which can be used to shame the chosen target: (1) external circumstances, which include birth, education, wealth, power, achievements, and citizenship; (2) physical attributes such as looks, health, speed, strength, and weakness; (3) qualities of character, or virtutes animi, such as wisdom, justice, courage, and self-restraint (for a brief list of such loci seeCic. Part. Or. 82). This kind ofverbal assault, conducted through an open recounting of the target’s faults and organized according to these loci, was often employed in judicial and deliberative speeches with the aim of turning the audience against its target. Invective was thus an ingredient in forensic and deliberative oratory and not an end in itself (Powell 2006). As noted in Rhetorica ad Herennium:
Et si separatim haec causa minus saepe tractatur, at in iudicialibus et in deliberativis causis saepe magnae partes versantur laudis aut vituperationis. quare in hoc quoque causae genere nonnihil industriae consumendum putemus. (Rhetorica ad Herrenium 3.15)
If this kind of oratory [epideictic] is only seldom employed by itself independently, nevertheless in judicial and deliberative contexts extensive sections are often devoted to praise or censure. Let us believe then that some of our hard work must be spent on this kind of speaking.
Given the extremely broad content of these invective loci in the theoretical treatises, modern scholars have attempted to identify a more detailed set of categories employed in practice by Greek and Roman speakers. The following list, compiled by Craig (2004: 190-1), comprises seventeen conventional loci of invective: (1) embarrassing family origins; (2) being unworthy of one’s family; (3) physical appearance; (4) eccentricity of dress; (5) gluttony and drunkenness, possibly leading to acts of crudelitas (‘‘cruelty’’) and libido (‘‘lust’’); (6) hypocrisy in appearing virtuous; (7) avarice, sometimes linked with prodigality; (8) taking bribes; (9) pretentiousness; (10) sexual conduct; (11) hostility to one’s family; (12) cowardice in war; (13) squandering one’s patrimony, or financial embarrassment in general; (14) aspiring to regnum or tyranny, often associated with vis (‘‘violence’’), libido, superbia (‘‘arrogance’’), and crudelitas; (15) cruelty to citizens and allies; (16) plunder of private and public property; (17) oratorical ineptitude. It is important to remember, however, that these are categories identified by modern scholars; in ancient rhetorical treatises invective does not appear as a genus in itself. Invective, as its etymology shows, was originally a cavalry charge, and therefore, in its metaphorical meaning, ‘‘the launching of an attack’’ against an opponent (Powell 2006). In the strict sense only speeches delivered, or supposedly delivered, as a direct attack against an individual should be considered invective. Among our extant speeches, these would include the In Vatinium, which presents the interrogation of a prosecution witness, Publius Vatinius, in Cicero’s defense of Sestius in 56 bce; the In Pisonem, Cicero’s response to fierce criticisms leveled against him by Piso in the senate in 55 bce; and the Second Philippic, an attack on Antony composed by Cicero in the form of a senatorial speech, but never actually delivered. However, if we are prepared to broaden our definition, speeches whose first aim was not to attack the opponent directly, but to discredit him or her in order to achieve a specific persuasive goal, might also be considered invective,. Thus, for example, Cicero’s speeches against Verres form part of the prosecution of the corrupt governor of Sicily, and so are not strictly speaking a direct denunciation of him. Nonetheless they present very effective attacks against the man and his administration of the province, and to this extent passages within them might be regarded as invective.
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