A recent discovery has brought us a splendid message scratched on a rock face in southern Jordan: ‘The Romans always win. I, Lauricius write this, Zeno.’126 Whoever wrote this, either a boastful Roman or a disgruntled native, was convinced of the inevitability of Roman victory. Indeed, despite occasional defeats the Roman army in the main fought successful campaigns to protect and extend the empire over a period of 300 years. Of course, it is easy to suggest possible reasons for Roman success in battle, such as superior resources, organization, manpower, discipline, weapons, leadership, and even a physical superiority that goes with long training, regular food and good sanitation. These factors may have contributed to success on some occasions, but they are variable.127
Thus, for example, the Romans could not match the potential manpower of the tribes beyond the Rhine and the Danube, and Tacitus noted not only that the Germans had very fine physiques, but also that the Chatti had mastered even that special Roman quality of discipline in battle.128 As for command, Roman officers were essentially non-specialist, with no formal training, although the centurions could provide consistency and experience.129 It was only in the later third and early fourth centuries that members of the equestrian order took over most military responsibilities from senators and a more professional ethos emerged, and it was precisely in this period that Roman superiority in battle began to disappear. Although Roman troops were certainly better-armed and - protected than their opponents, they had no overwhelming superiority, as in the use of guns against swords. Furthermore, the empire did not develop a strategic or diplomatic initiative for total security. It remained a string of provinces based in the Mediterranean, dealt with individual military problems on an ad hoc basis in different areas, and was vulnerable to simultaneous attacks on several fronts. The main tactical development in the army up to ad 300 amounted to the creation of stronger cavalry forces (though it is by no means clear how much impact this had in battle), and the field army, which in theory could travel with the emperor to any troubled area. Roman discipline was usually very effective and was sometimes rigorously enforced. Therefore, in Africa in ad 20 when a legionary cohort turned tail and abandoned its commander to his fate, the provincial governor applied the traditional punishment by which, after a drawing of lots, every tenth man was flogged to death.130 Yet it is likely that discipline was not uniformly or consistently enforced, and was probably applied more toughly during campaigns.131
More important perhaps was a factor that operated consistently in Rome’s favour. The Roman army was a professional standing army with a trained ruthlessness and the resources necessary to wear down all opposition in a long campaign. Opponents who could not stay in the field for long might be forced to seek a quick battle.132 Roman soldiers had confidence in their superiority and their ultimate victory because they were part of an army whose successful record had been demonstrated over generations. They had the psychological boost of generally being on the attack. This is demonstrated by the offensive tactics usually adopted by Roman commanders, confirming the idea of innate Roman superiority. All this was supported by a thoroughly professional and meticulous preparation for campaigns, seen in effective scouting, the use of marching columns deployed to suit the terrain and the likelihood of imminent attack, and well-organized temporary and permanent camping techniques.133 If things did go wrong, as the experienced officer Velleius Paterculus pointed out, the almost routine valour of the Roman soldier, his obedience to military practice and his loyalty to his comrades could win the day, even when his commander had failed him. In a dangerous moment during the war in Pannonia, when several officers and centurions had been wounded and the army was hard-pressed, ‘the legions, shouting encouragement to each other, charged the enemy, and not content with repelling their onslaught broke through their battle line and won victory from a desperate situation’.134
Once the legions had defeated the enemy in battle, the follow-up was determined, violent and unrelenting. As there were no clear rules for ending a battle, when the opposition disintegrated the Romans had free disposition of material, people and land if they so chose.135 In the reign of Augustus, for example, Marcus Crassus hounded a Thracian tribe (the Bastarnae) almost to complete annihilation,136 and the revolt of the Pannonians in AD 6 was crushed with extreme ferocity.137 After the short-lived mutiny of AD 14, Germanicus led the legions across the Rhine to redeem themselves: ‘[They] devastated the country with fire and sword for fifty miles around. No pity was shown to age or sex. Religious as well as secular buildings were razed to the ground.’138 The following year Germanicus advanced unexpectedly on the Chatti: ‘Helpless women, children, and old people were immediately captured or massacred.’139 Then, in ad 16, also under Germanicus’ command, the Romans crushed the Cherusci:
The rest were indiscriminately massacred. Many tried to swim the Weser. They were bombarded with javelins, or swept away by the current, or finally overwhelmed by the press of fugitives and the collapse of the river banks. Some shamefully tried to escape by climbing up trees. As they concealed themselves among the branches, bowmen had fun by shooting them down. Others were brought down by felling the trees. It was a great victory and we had few casualties. The massacre of the enemy continued from midday until dusk, and their bodies and weapons were scattered for ten miles around.140
When, under Domitian, the Nasamones, a Numidian tribe, revolted, the governor of Numidia obliterated them, including non-combatants. The emperor commented: ‘I have forbidden the Nasamones to exist.’141
Defeat in battle against the Romans was often accompanied by the extermination or deportation of the men of military age, like that perpetrated by Tiberius and Drusus in Raetia in 15 bc: ‘Because the country had a large population and seemed likely to rebel, they deported most of the strongest men who were of military age, leaving only enough to populate the land but not enough to start a revolt.’142 Similarly, in Pannonia, Tiberius enslaved and deported all men of military age and ravaged the land.143 Plautius Silvanus Aelianus celebrated among his exploits as governor of Moesia in the reign of Nero the fact that he ‘brought across more than 100,000 of the number ofTransdanubians for the payment of taxes, together with their wives and children and leaders or kings’.144 The Romans occasionally resorted to mutilation. The historian Florus, writing in the second century AD, despised foreign peoples and thought that savage enemies could only be tamed by using their own methods against them. Referring to the war against the Thracians, he comments, ‘captives were savagely treated by fire and sword, but the barbarians thought that nothing was more awful than that they should be left alive with their hands cut off and be forced to survive their punishment’.145 Leaders of peoples that opposed the Romans who did not die or commit suicide (like Decebalus) during the campaign were often brought back to Rome to be paraded in the emperor’s triumphal procession, after which they were ceremonially executed.
The triumphal procession [of Vespasian and Titus] reached its conclusion at the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus where they came to a halt. It was an ancient custom to wait here until the death of the general of the enemy should be announced. This man was Simon, son of Gioras, who had just taken part in the procession with the prisoners; then a noose was placed round his neck and he was whipped by his escort as he was dragged to the place near the forum where Roman law demands that those condemned to death for villainy should be executed. When it was announced that Simon was dead there was a roar of approval and they began the sacrifices.146
Enemies of Rome who took refuge behind walls found no respite, for the ruthless cruelty displayed by the Romans in finishing off a defeated foe was matched by the determination, skill and extreme violence with which they conducted sieges and made a cruel example of those who continued to resist. In the Republic, Polybius the Greek historian noted the violence with which the Romans sometimes behaved during sieges. When they stormed New Carthage in 209 bc, Scipio Africanus
Directed most of them, according to the Roman custom, against the people in the city, telling them to kill everyone they met and to spare no one, and not to start looting until the order was given to do so. The purpose of this custom is to strike terror. You can often see in cities captured by the Romans not only human beings who have been massacred, but even dogs sliced in two and the limbs of other animals cut off.147
Of course the Romans were technically very well equipped, with powerful siege weapons, including battering-rams, wicker and hide screens, scaling towers, stone-throwing catapults and machines for firing bolts like arrow heads, and were particularly skilled in the building of extensive earth-works.148 In most respects Roman siege methods were not much more advanced than those employed in the Hellenistic period, but the Roman army was distinguished by its determination, persistence and professional competence, and of course its ability to stay in the field almost indefinitely.
to the writing of Josephus we are well informed about the spectacular five-month siege at Jerusalem in ad 70, and the six-month siege of Masada by Flavius Silva, which ended in 73 or 74.149 At Masada it is still possible to see the Roman circumvallation, eight siege camps, and the siege mound, which was built up to the base of the walls as a platform for artillery. The Roman main camp, though on lower ground, is built on a slope so that it seems to loom up towards the defenders on the rampart above. On a smaller scale, it is interesting to look at the siege of Jotapata early in the same Jewish revolt, in which Josephus himself defended the town against Vespasian. Here the Jews penned up in the city faced three Roman legions supported by auxiliaries and 160 catapults. Vespasian used an artillery barrage to drive the defenders from the walls and prevent them from dropping boulders, so that a siege mound could be built. Josephus describes how a stone from one of the catapults knocked off a man’s head and allegedly carried it for about 550 metres. The defenders tried to build their walls higher and lowered sacks of chaff to break the force of the battering-ram. Eventually the Romans got a ram up to the walls, made a breach and put gangways in place. Then, while the Jews were occupied by a general assault on the walls, the legionaries, using the tortoise (testudo) formation, in which they interlocked their shields above their heads, forced their way through the breach, although the Jews poured boiling oil over them and oily liquid on to the gangway to make it slippery.150 The end was characteristic:
On that day the Romans massacred all the people who showed themselves. On the following days they searched the hiding places and took their vengeance on those who hid in underground vaults and caverns. They spared no one whatever their age, except for children and women. One thousand two hundred prisoners were collected, and the total number of the dead, both during the final capture and in earlier battles, was calculated at 40,000. Vespasian ordered the city to be razed to the ground and all the forts to be burnt.151
Although Josephus may have exaggerated some of the damage done by Roman catapults, this is probably a good indication of the panic created among the inexperienced by these weapons.
The Romans clearly felt few restraints in dealing with people they felt were obstinate in their resistance. Frontinus, the distinguished Roman senator, who held several military commands and was governor of Britain (ad 73/4-77), in his collection of military stratagems, cites several methods for bringing a war to a close after a successful battle. The three examples he cites from Roman history show the use of severed enemy heads to intimidate the survivors. Thus he describes how the famous general Domitius
Corbulo, when besieging Tigranocerta in Armenia, reckoned that the defenders would hold out obstinately. He therefore
Executed Vadandus, one of the noblemen he had captured, shot his head out of a catapult, and sent it flying inside the fortifications of the enemy. It happened to fall right in the middle of a council meeting that the barbarians were holding just at that moment, and the sight of it (like some portent) so terrorised them that they hurriedly surrendered.152
The Romans of course had other ways of inspiring terror, in many smaller-scale incidents that we probably only rarely hear about. When the people of the town of Uspe in the Crimea offered to surrender, ‘the victorious Romans rejected this because it was cruel to slaughter men who had surrendered, but difficult to provide guards for such large numbers (about 10,000). It was better that they should meet their death in proper warfare. So the soldiers, who had scaled the walls on ladders, were ordered to kill them.’153 The thorough elimination by the Roman army of those who took refuge behind walls contributed to an impression of overwhelming power that could not be stopped, and in the case of Uspe had a devastating psychological effect on neighbouring peoples. ‘The destruction of Uspe instilled terror into the others. Weapons, fortifications, mountains and obstacles, rivers, and cities had all equally been overcome.’154 Indeed, the economic and social consequences of defeat by Rome were incalculable. This idea was forcibly expressed by Josephus when he condemned the futility of the Jewish revolt of ad 66 in a speech given to king Agrippa II. ‘Are you really going to close your eyes to the Roman empire, and are you not going to recognize your own weakness? Is it not the case that our troops have often been defeated even by neighbouring peoples, while their army is undefeated throughout the entire world?’155 In the end the Jews saw their historic capital city and the great temple destroyed, and a Roman legion permanently quartered there. The money previously contributed by Jews for the upkeep of the temple was now collected by a special Roman treasury.156
The final link in the chain of Roman success was the competent organization of ordnance and logistics to support the army on campaign. Given the technological limits of the ancient world, the Romans certainly seem to have been far ahead of other peoples whom they encountered. For example, Tacitus, while noting that the Parthian forces had certain qualities, also criticized them for their inability to press sieges and for their incompetent commissariat.157 There is unfortunately very little evidence for how the Romans organized the logistics of their campaigns. The army could carry all its own supplies and equipment, which would have made it very cumbersome and slow-moving, or use a supply dump and supply columns, which were vulnerable and needed troops deployed to protect them. Both of these options involved the use of huge numbers of wagons, carts and draught animals. Food and fodder would also have to be carried, although in the right season an army could live off the land by sending out foraging parties.158 In keeping the army supplied, the impressive network of roads was an important feature, ensuring the effective movement of supplies and provisions.159 Furthermore, Roman domination of the Mediterranean and the main rivers of Europe allowed water transport by the imperial fleets.160
Emperors tried to keep soldiers comfortable and reasonably contented while they were inflicting massive devastation and deprivation on the enemy. This meant not only keeping them supplied but also well protected in proper camps or forts, and looking after their material comforts. On one level we can see the future emperor Tiberius trying hard to please his officers and make military campaigns rather more pleasant by offering them the use of his doctor, litter, kitchen and private bath.161 For the ordinary soldier, apart from food and clothing, an efficient medical service was probably of greatest psychological importance. Traditionally, it was important to look after wounded soldiers and the Romans took this seriously.162 The good commander shared the hardships of his men, and it was considered disgraceful if he abandoned his wounded. Tacitus directly criticizes Caesennius Paetus who surrendered to the Parthians at Rhandeia and then beat an undignified retreat. ‘In one day Paetus marched forty miles, abandoning the wounded all along the way. This panic-striken flight was no less disgraceful than running away in battle.’163 Finally, if a soldier had to be invalided out because of wounds or illness, he received his discharge benefits in proportion to the nature of his disability and the number of years he had served in the army.164Therefore soldiers were protected against destitution as far as possible, and it is worth pointing out that this kind of provision was not common practice in armies until comparatively recent times.
However, soldiers in all ages must face up to the fate of death in battle. One striking story of personal tragedy, and also of compassion and remembrance, appears in the inscription of Marcus Caelius from Bologna in northern Italy, a centurion who died in Germany in the military disaster of Quinctilius Varus in ad 9. His body was never identified, and his remains were probably buried on the battlefield by Germanicus’ army in 15. His monument, set up by his brother at Vetera (Xanten) in Lower Germany, has a carving of Caelius in full uniform holding his centurion’s staff and displaying his military decorations:
Marcus Caelius, son of Titus of the tribe Lemonia, from Bononia, centurion of legion XVIII, fifty-three and a half years old, fell in the Varian war. Permission is granted to place his bones within [the monument]. Publius Caelius, son ofTitus, of the tribe Lemonia, his brother, set this up.165
World History
