The erosion of the Aegean and Syrian possessions of the Ptolemies in the late third and early second centuries BC was to leave them with only two foreign provinces: Cyrenaica and Cyprus. Polybius blames the rot squarely on the character deficiencies of Ptolemy IV himself, but the decline of Ptolemaic power lay deeper than the iniquities of a single ruler. In the first place, dynastic schism, which had its roots in the very institutional character of the monarchy itself, became a recurrent feature of Ptolemaic history, generating murderous bouts of internecine strife that at best were enervating and at worst raised instability in the kingdom to a disastrous level. These problems were often aggravated by the fury of the Alexandrian mob, which first surfaced at the death of Ptolemy IV in the lynching of his minister Agathocles— indeed, nothing gives a better picture of their unbridled and vicious temper than Polybius’ description of the murder of Agathocles’ relatives and associates:
All of them were then handed over together to the mob, and some began to bite them, others to stab them, others to gouge out their eyes. As soon as any of them fell, the body was torn limb from limb until they had mutilated them all; for the savagery of the Egyptians is truly appalling when their passions are aroused. (Polybius, 15.33)
Their predilections as king-makers are subsequently demonstrated in numerous episodes. Thus the long conflict between Ptolemy VI and VIII frequently involved the actions of the mob, and in 80 bc they excelled themselves by assassinating Ptolemy X himself. Finally in 48/7 BC their anarchic propensities reached a crescendo that culminated in the summary destruction of their power by none other than Julius Caesar. The effects of these inherent weaknesses at the centre of the kingdom were compounded on many occasions by the self-seeking ambition of high-ranking Greeks, military and civilian, who were determined to do anything to further their personal interests.
In Egypt outside Alexandria the political situation rapidly deteriorated from the late third century bc onwards, as the country seethed with internal discord. These circumstances certainly facilitated the elevation of some of the more able and enterprising Egyptians, and there is clear evidence that they were succeeding in closing or even eliminating the gap that normally existed between Greek and Egyptian, gaining estates of some considerable size and even attaining the rank of provincial governor (strategos) or governor-general (epistrategos). The recurrent civil unrest has often been seen as a nationalistic, ethnically motivated reaction by Egyptians against the hated Greek, but the situation was clearly much more complex than that and is probably better read as the natural outcome of the weakening of royal authority that created a context where ancient rivalries and aspirations of various kinds were no longer contained by central authority. These might be hostilities between Egyptian cities, as when Hermonthis {Armant) and Theban Crocodilopolis went to war against each other in the time of Ptolemy VIII (170-116 bc). Again, when, between 205 and 186 BC, an independent state was established in the Thebaid, governed in succession by two native kings called Haronnophris and Chaon-nophris, we may well be seeing a resurgence of the ancient political ambitions of the priesthood of Amun, and it is worth noting that, in the final battle in 186 bc, Nubian troops fought in Chaonnophris’ army—that is, we may also have evidence of a resurgence of the ancient interest in Thebes by Nubian devotees of the god. However, since religiously determined xenophobia is a soundly documented phenomenon in the Late Period, it would be extremely suprising if it were totally absent from Egyptian motives in this move to independence.
There are many other signs, large scale and otherwise, of disaffection among the Egyptian population—strikes, flight (sometimes to the point where whole settlements were abandoned), brigandage, attacks by desperadoes on villages, despoliation of temples, and frequent recourse to the temples’ right of asylum. These are indisputably the reactions of people pushed beyond the limits of endurance by famine, rampant inflation, and an oppressive and vicious administrative system operated by officials who were all too often corrupt and beyond the effective control of central government. Against such men, the lower strata of society, who were largely Egyptian, were, in reality, defenceless and, therefore, easy targets. Uprisings by these people might easily be constmed as nationalistic, given the close congruence between economic status and ethnic origin, and we can be confldent that they acquired that dimension explicitly from time to time, but at the most fundamental level the uprisings were those of the oppressed against the establishment regarded as responsible for that oppression, and that establishment could just as easily be perceived as the Eg)rptian priesthood and their temples as Graeco-Macedonian officialdom. Whatever the motivation, however, the corrosive economic effects of these disruptions struck a deadly blow at the economic infrastructure at precisely the time when alternative sources of wealth had largely dried up.
All these internal events were played out against the backdrop of growing interventionism by Rome in the Eastern Mediterranean. Sometimes solicited, sometimes not, this process led progressively to the elimination of the kingdom of Macedon (167 bc), the acquisition of the kingdom of Pergamum in 133 bc, the gradual erosion of Seleucid power culminating in the annexation of the rump of the kingdom in 64 BC, and eventually the demise of the kingdom of the Ptolemies itself The last event was long in coming and was the last episode in Ptolemaic relations with Rome that went back to the early years of the dynasty and evolved through several phases. Starting on a basis of equality in the reign of Ptolemy II with diplomatic courtesies between equals expressed in an embassy to Rome in 273 bc, we move in the early second century bc to a situation where Rome became the guarantor of Egyptian independence.
Polybius’ description of C. Popilius Laenas’ removal of Antiochus IV from Egyptian territory in 168 bc perfectly illustrates the ensuing shift in power. On handing the king the Senate’s decree:
Popilius did something which seemed insolent and arrogant to the highest degree. With a vine stick which he had in his hand he drew a circle around Antiochus and told him to give his reply to the message before he stepped out of that circle. The king was astounded by the arrogance of this action and hesitated for a short time and said he would do everything the Romans asked. (Polybius, 29. 27)
From this it was a natural progression to become the mediator in dynastic disputes: during the long-drawn-out quarrel between the brothers Ptolemy VI and VIII, Rome was the arbitrator; Ptolemy XI (80 Bc) owed his kingdom to Rome and allegedly left it to his benefactor by will; in the dispute between the Alexandrians and Ptolemy XII (80-51 Bc), Rome played a decisive role; and Rome’s involvement in the murderous conflicts between Cleopatra VII and her brothers Ptolemy XIII and XIV ushered in the last phase of Ptolemaic kingship.
In this maelstrom, and improbably, Cleopatra was able briefly to resurrect past glories c.36 bc when, through the largesse of Mark Antony, we see the fleeting resurgence of Ptolemaic control in southern Asia Minor and Syria-Palestine, but this ran counter to the general trend that featured Rome as the sole beneficiary of the long decline of the dynasty; Cyrenaica was acquired in 96 bc, Cyprus in 58. Finally, it was Egypt’s turn. In 30 bc, through a struggle as spectacular and dramatic as anything that antiquity can offer, this brilliant and ancient kingdom fell to Rome, thereby initiating the final long-drawn-out chapter in the history of pharaonic culture.
World History
