Shortly after the death of Suppiluliuma, his successor, Arnuwanda II, also died. The young Mursili II ascended the throne, but found himself in a difficult situation. The king reports upheavals in all the lands conquered by his father. In fact, these states clearly doubted Mursili’s ability to subdue them once again. Within Hatti, the pestilence had not just physically hindered the land, but had also harmed its overall morale. It was believed that such a divine punishment must have had an original cause, to be found in the reign of Suppiluliuma. Even on a personal level, it is possible that such a strong, yet largely absent, father figure must have had an impact on his young successor.
Therefore, on the one hand, Mursili began an intense military campaign, almost to prove to his subjects that he was no less than his father. On the other hand, Mursili questioned himself and the gods on the cause of the pestilence, and on the sins supposedly committed by his father. Perhaps, the latter had failed to perform some of his cultic duties due to his campaigns, or just broke an oath for political reasons. Be that as it may, Suppiluliuma had left an empire that was as vast as it was infested with pestilence. Mursili wanted to be both heroic and pious, and attributed all his successes to Ishtar, his protector. We also owe to Mursili the redaction of his annals in two versions, the Ten Year Annals (Text 18.1) and the Detailed Annals, as well as the account of the deeds of his father Suppiluliuma.
Text 18.1 Hittite historiography: from the Ten Year Annals of Mursili II (years 6 and 7)
‘The following year I went into the land of Zihariya. The Kaska, who had occupied Mount Tarikarimu by force during the reign of my father, had become a threat to Hattusa: they came and attacked Hattusa, and caused severe damage. I, His Majesty, went and attacked the Kaska that had conquered Mount Tarikarimu; the Sun-goddess of Arinna, my lady, the mighty Tarhunta, my lord, Mezzulla and all the gods marched before me: I defeated the Kaska ofMount Tarikarimu, I destroyed them, I laid waste to Mount Tarikarimu, and devastated with fire the entire region of Zihariya; then, I returned to Hattusa. I did this in one year.
The following year I went to the land of Tipiya. While my father was in the land of Mitanni, Pihuniya, a man of Tipiya, began to march and pursued several incursions in the Upper Land, he reached Zazisha, took up the Upper Land, and deported it to the land of Kaska; he conquered the entire land of Ishtitina and turned it into land for his pastures. Moreover, Pihuniya did not rule in the Kaskean manner: among the Kaska one man did not hold power alone, but all of a sudden that Pihuniya began to rule like a king. I, His Majesty, went to him, I sent him a messenger and wrote to him: “Send me my subjects that you took and deported among the Kaska!” But Pihuniya answered thusly: “I will not give anything back to you! And if you will wage war against me, I will not prepare for battle in my land: I will march against you in your territory and will prepare for battle against you in your territory!” When Pihuniya answered me in this way and did not return my subjects, I marched against him and attacked his territory; the Sun-goddess Arinna, my lady, the mighty Tarhunta, Mezzulla and all the gods marched before me: I conquered the entire land of Tipiya and destroyed it with fire, I captured Pihuniya and deported him to Hattusa. Then, I returned to the land of Tipiya and restored the region of Ishtitina that Pihuniya had taken, and turned it once again into the land of Hattusa.’
Apart from the endemic turbulence of the Kaska, Mursili had to engage on two fronts, namely, Syria and Arzawa. Thankfully, not ah recently conquered Syrian states were rebelling. After ah, Hittite control was left in the hands ofMursili’s brothers, Telipinu, king ofAleppo, and Piyashshili, king ofCarchemish. While the former brother died prematurely, the latter, who had already proved his abilities in his conquest of Mitanni, acted as the real leader of the Hittite resistance. The Syrian rebellion began in Nuhashe and Qadesh, reaching Ugarit, but not Amurru. The king of Amurru, Aziru, actually remained loyal to the Hittites, and so did his son.
On their part, the Egyptians tried to take advantage of the upheavals in Syria. The new Egyptian king Horemheb campaigned in the north, fought against the Hittites, but had to retreat. Despite the death of some of the most important players in Syria, from Aziru to Piyashshili, Mursili managed to consolidate Hit-tite control once again. He appointed new functionaries in Syria and signed a series of treaties. We possess the treaties signed with Talmi-Sharruma of Aleppo, Niqmepa of Ugarit and Duppi-Teshub of Amurru.
Carchemish, the main stronghold of Hittite control in Syria, received a considerable amount of territories, from the ancient kingdom of Mukish to Siyannu, south of Ugarit.
In Arzawa the situation was different. Suppiluliuma had never managed to establish solid control in the area, even though Hatti’s supremacy was effectively recognised throughout Anatolia. Mursili therefore had to face a composite state. Arzawa, ruled by Uhha-ziti, held a hegemonic position over the other kingdoms of southeastern Anatolia: Mira, Kuwaliya, Hapalla and the Land of the Sheha River. Mursili thus moved his troops towards the Aegean Sea, forced Uhha-ziti to flee, accepted the surrender of some states, and conquered the others. In the end, Mursili was able to consolidate control over the area through a series oftreaties (similar to the ones stipulated in Syria) with Manapa-Tarhunta of Sheha, Mashhuiluwa of Mira-Kuwaliya, and Targashnalli of Hapalla. In the second half of Mursili’s reign, however, Mashhuiluwa betrayed him. This forced Mursili to lead new campaigns and sign treaties with new vassals. However, Hittite control over Arzawa remained solid.
At the end of Mursili’s reign, Central and southern Anatolia, from the Aegean to the Euphrates, was under Hittite control, either directly or through its vassals, linked to the empire through treaties. However, the Pontus and the Black Sea coast remained unconquered and a constant worry for the Hittites. Admittedly, it was a predominantly mountainous area, largely uninhabited and not technologically advanced. Nonetheless, the proximity of this turbulent area to the Hittite capital Hattusa was still threatening. The loss of control over prestigious sanctuaries in the north, Nerikka in particular, was also a problem for the empire. Moreover, the constant intrusions of the Kaska and the shift of the main political interests of the Hittites to the south had made the capital relatively marginal and thus exposed to attacks.
Mursili’s son and successor, Muwatalli, tried to formalise the complex management of the empire. Control over the northern territories and the border with the Kaska was delegated to his brother, Hattusili. He held the title of king of Hakpish and ruled over Pala (in north-western Anatolia), Kaska, and the ‘Upper Lands’ (in the Upper Halys area). Hattusili led a war against the Kaska until the liberation of Nerikka and other sanctuaries, and the removal of potential threats to Hattusa. At the peak of the war, Muwatalli abandoned the capital. He moved his court to Tarhuntassa, further south, and got involved in the events taking place beyond the Taurus Mountains.
In fact, the beginning of the thirteenth century bc saw the revival of Assyria’s and Egypt’s expansionistic campaigns. Under Adad-nirari I and Shalmaneser I, Assyria immediately conquered Mitanni/Hanigalbat and, despite Hittite intervention, managed to consolidate its control over the region. As a result, the Euphrates became the frontier between Hatti and Assyria, and Carchemish, formerly chosen to be at the centre of the Hittite territories south of the Taurus, now became the stronghold of the Hittite border with Assyria, a position that the city would keep for a long time. Even Egypt revived its campaigns in the Near East under the kings of the nineteenth dynasty. Seti I and Ramses II both tried to move north to remove Qadesh and the Upper Orontes Valley from Hittite control. Despite its celebration in his inscriptions, Seti’s attempt did not have a concrete outcome. On the contrary, Ramses II’s campaign had been more solid, relying on the betrayal of the king of Amurru, Benteshina, in favour of Egypt. Muwatalli fiercely reacted to this betrayal and faced Egypt in battle. Ramses II arrived north with a large army, clashed with the Hittite army at Qadesh, and had to retreat, leaving Amurru to the Hittites. The border was kept south of Qadesh, despite the fact that the Hittite counter-attack moved as far as Damascus.
When Muwatalli died, the bipartition of the Hittite state caused several dynastic problems. Hattusili wanted at least to keep control over the northern territories, and perhaps hoped to be able to influence his young nephew, Urhi-Teshub, son and successor of Muwatalli. However, Urhi-Teshub could not accept the supremacy of his uncle and tried to keep him under control, even moving the Hittite capital back to Hattusa. Hattusili rebelled and, with the support of many members of the elite and several vassals, faced his nephew in war, seizing the throne and exiling Urhi-Teshub to Syria and then Egypt. This move truly was a coup d’etat, which the usurper (yet another one in the history of Hatti) justified through his Apology. This text pointed out Urhi-Teshub’s illegitimate claim to the throne, since he was a ‘bastard son’, and his arrogance. However, these were more Hattusili’s ‘sins’, rather than his nephew’s. Moreover, the text describes the divine support and omens used to justify Hattusili’s claim to the throne. The latter was described as legitimate simply because it succeeded not just on a political level, through the support of the elite and Hattusili’s military victories, but even on a theological level. Considering the fact that the gods had allowed a ‘small king’ to succeed a ‘great king’, how could Hattusili’s claim not have been legitimate?
Having seized the throne, Hattusili tried to defend himself from the branch of the royal family that had been damaged by his usurpation. He gave the kingdom of Tarhuntassa to one of Urhi-Teshub’s brothers, Ulmi-Teshub (whose throne name was Kurunta), who had supported his uncle during the civil war. Tarhuntassa was a vast kingdom, extending from the salt lakes’ area to the Mediterranean coast. It received a privileged status, comparable to the one of Carchemish. Hattusili’s rise to power also drastically changed the kingdom’s foreign affairs. Hattusili reinstated Benteshina, who meanwhile had become his son-in-law, on Amurru’s throne. Moreover, the Hittite king took advantage of Egypt’s reduced involvement in the Near East. In fact, after the outcome of the battle of Qadesh, Ramses II seems to have been more interested in celebrating his achievements within Egypt (Figure 18.2), than in pushing his border in Syria a couple of kilometres to the north.
Hattusili and Ramses therefore sealed a friendly alliance, which envisioned the two empires as equal, and used Hittite diplomatic formulas (completely unknown to the Egyptians). This peaceful treaty constitutes a real success for Hattusili. He achieved that formal equality considered unacceptable for the eighteenth dynasty kings during Suppiluliuma’s reign, barely a century earlier. The alliance was further strengthened by the marriage of Ramses II with a daughter (or maybe two) of Hattusili. This gesture gave the Egyptian king the opportunity to celebrate within Egypt his apparent supremacy in the Near East. At the same time, it assured the Hittites that the border in Syria was now established, and that normal commercial and diplomatic interactions were to substitute former expansionistic attempts. With regards to relations between Hatti and Babylonia, a letter of Hattusili to the young Kassite king, Kadashman-Enlil, begins with a paternalistic and protective attitude towards the Babylonian king. The letter then moves on to examine a series of commercial and political controversies.
Problems with Assyria mainly arose with the reign of Hattusili’s son and successor, Tudhaliya IV. The situation had become increasingly tense after the Assyrian conquest of Hanigalbat and the consolidation of the frontier between Hatti and Assyria along the Euphrates in the reign of Tukulti-Ninurta I. The two empires were therefore at war. Amurru was forbidden to allow merchants (both local and foreign, especially Mycenaean merchants from Ahhiyawa) to reach Assyria. Ugarit was exempted from sending troops in aid of the war against Assyria in exchange for a large tribute. Hatti mobilised large military contingents and economic contributions to face the Assyrians in war. However, both armies were too strong to move beyond the Euphrates frontier. Contentious letters were exchanged, and important battles were fought. Especially in Assyria, there was a concrete attempt at celebrating their military achievements, in order to compensate for the lack of definitive outcomes. Unlike the fictitious propaganda attested in Egypt and Assyria, Hatti did not need to take such measures. After all, preventing the expansionistic attempts of its two powerful neighbours constituted an achievement in itself. Further wars were fought by Tudhaliya in the Mediterranean. He first led an expedition to Cyprus, recounted by his son when he returned to the island. He then sealed diplomatic alliances in order to cease the revolts (supported by the Mycenae-ans) taking place on the Aegean coast of Anatolia. These revolts are attested in the so-called ‘Letter of Milawata’. The Hittites were therefore facing threats on several fronts, but for the time being managed to resist.
Internally, Tudhaliya was suffering the consequences of his father’s usurpation, and tried to protect himself from his subjects’ betrayals, He thus pointed out the negative example set by those who supported his father. In reality, the usurpation actually granted the throne to Tudhaliya himself Above all, Tudhaliya confirmed the privileged status of Kurunta, king of Tarhuntassa, who began to use the title of ‘great king’. We exceptionally possess the original copy, written on a bronze tablet, of a treaty between Hatti and Tarhuntassa defining the borders of this kingdom. Among the greatest achievements of Tudhaliya’s reign,
Figure 18.2 The battle of Qadesh (reliefs of Ramses 11 in the temple of Luxor).
Figure 18.3 The acropolis in Hattusa at the end of the Hittite empire, ca. 1200 bc. Plan (above) and reconstruction of the south-western gate (below).
However, there was the enlargement (almost to double its original size) of the Hittite capital. The king commissioned the addition of a wall that included the sacred upper city (Figure 18.3), and the construction of the sanctuary of Yazilikaya, near Hattusa.
Despite some successes, the situation worsened in the reigns of the last two Hittite kings, Arnuwanda III and Suppiluliuma II. Suppiluliuma managed to conquer Alashiya (Cyprus) through a naval battle and disembarked troops on the island. It was such a sensational achievement that it was recorded both in a written treaty and an inscription (written in Luwian hieroglyphs) left in the upper city of the Hittite capital. However, on a political level the conquest probably did not last long. By now, Syria was no longer under direct Hittite control. This was partly due to the delegation of control to Carchemish and the consolidation of exemptions and disengagements, which had been granted or at least tolerated, when the political situation was still relatively solid.
Even in Anatolia control seems to have slipped from the hands of the last Hittite kings, who were constantly engaged in ensuring a loyalty that was becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. There were too many claimants, too many bad examples and too many dangers to effectively establish a system of loyalties in the Hittite state. ‘Loyalty’ could only be an effective means to establish political control when it was balanced in a complex network of reciprocal support. It was in the interest of everyone involved to keep this balance alive. Therefore, the great king ruled through the support of his subjects and vassals, and the latter survived thanks to the great king’s support. Reading the sources from the last phase of the empire, the loyalty expected by the king from his subjects seems not to have been reciprocated anymore. It therefore became a simple moral and legal obligation, and not the result of a reciprocal interaction. The tone of these texts thus seems increasingly concerned, almost panicked, by the fear of being abandoned.
It is not easy to understand how this deterioration could have taken place in such a short period of time. The political decline of the Hittite state certainly developed in parallel with the depopulation of Hatti. The land was exhausted by the constant effort of maintaining solid control over the conquered territories from a relatively unpopulated centre. Moreover, this deterioration was also contemporaneous to the overall decline of the powers ruling in the Near East. As we will see, this sudden decline will involve Hatti, its subjects, and even its enemies, in a general process of reorganisation of the entire area.