As decisive as the effects of the Peloponnesian War were (excellent on this topic, Hornblower 2002: 184-209), there were, on the other hand, many features that demonstrate continuity. Accordingly, even after the defeat of Athens, the ‘tyrannical city-state’ (polis tyrannos, Thuc. 1.124.3; 2.63.2), war and reckless ambition did not diminish. Indeed, many Greeks expected that the world of two opposite camps would come to an end and usher in a great longing for freedom (Xenophon Hellenika 2.2.23). In fact, however, Sparta’s victory did not even produce a lasting peace. The new hegemon had to concede that it was more difficult to establish a stable postwar state of affairs than it was to defeat the enemy. And the attempt, as the new champion of the freedom of the Greeks in Asia Minor, to resume the war against Persia was too much for a state which had a total of only slightly more than 2,000 full citizens fit for military service (Cartledge 1987, convincingly). The Spartans, however, lacked not only adequate resources, but also the ‘know-how’ and imagination necessary for successfully playing the role of a great power. They had too little knowledge of the world they wanted to govern. Moreover, their own institutions were scarcely exportable abroad. Nor did they possess a trained bureaucracy by which an empire could be administered. The leaders in Sparta were well aware that they were overstretched for running an empire, but were incapable of coming up with a satisfactory solution. But most importantly, it was impossible to stop. This characteristic feature linked the period before with the one after 404. The Spartans, no less than the Athenians (e. g., Walter 2003), fell under the spell of the thirst for power.
We shall advance some abstract considerations in an attempt to explain the structural ‘inability of the Greeks to carry out foreign policy’ (Stahl 2003b: 253-60), as this became particularly evident in the Classical Period. Three fixed objectives characterized the policies of all protagonists - hegemony, autonomy and peace with other states. The combination of all three factors was impossible under the prevailing circumstances. From time to time two of the objectives could be harmonized, but at no given time could the third be combined with the other two. By considering the three possibilities that arose from this configuration, the multifarious nature of events can be construed and explained in the form of patterns:
1 All states strove for freedom (eleuthereia and autonomia) vis a vis other poleis, with the larger states at the same time also striving for power (hegemonia or arche) over as many other states as possible. Since these two principles were diametrically opposed to each other, they could only be pursued at the price of continual discord.
2 Peace and hegemony would have been reconcilable if a sufficiently strong power could have established itself on a permanent basis. But even Athens, whose naval empire encompassed only part of the Greeks, was never free from attack; in any event, her empire collapsed in 404, and, despite all her efforts, she could not restore her power to its former state. The idea of autonomy continued unabated, and became even stronger through the rise of new powers, such as Thebes. The following attempts to establish and maintain hegemonic power were therefore of even shorter duration. Despite at least thirty years as hegemon, Sparta went down in a single battle (Leuktra 371), and Thebes after no more than nine years, through the death of Epameinondas, the ‘architect’ of the Theban hegemony (Mantineia 362). After this the last major battle between two contenders for hegemony had been fought, the historian Xenophon stated with resignation that, despite the military victory of Thebes, no clear decision had been reached; confusion and disorder, he maintained, were even greater than hitherto (Xenophon Hellenika 7.5.27).
3 The fundamental idea behind the so-called Common Peace (koine eirene) was the attempt to blend autonomy and peace (Jehne 1994), but the existence and efforts of hegemonic powers were still a factor. Furthermore, it was the demand that the principle of autonomy should be unconditionally observed which repeatedly gave the powers acting as ‘guarantors’ of the peace accords, above all Sparta, a pretext to intervene in the affairs of other states. Compared with this, the instruments devised to regulate inter-state relations with a view to peace remained underdeveloped and ineffective in real conflicts.
World History
