‘Rib-Adda says to the king, my lord: I prostrate myself at the feet of my lord, seven and seven times I prostrate myself.
C Since my lord has written to me asking me for taskarinnu - wood, this can be found in Zalhi and Ugarit, but I cannot send ships over there because Aziru is hostile to me and the rulers of all the cities are allied to him: their ships move as they wish and take whatever they want.
A Since the king, my lord, says: “Protect them, and protect the city of the king who is with you,” how can
I protect it? I have written to the king, my lord: “All the cities are taken, only Byblos and another one are left.” I have sent a messenger to the king, my lord, but troops have not been sent to me and the messenger has not been released either. . .’
It is probably true that more than a decade of control in the area would have lowered Egyptian military presence in the Near East, turning the rounds to collect tributes into a mere routine. It is also true that the rumblings of Suppiluliuma’s interventions in Syria sparked several reactions in the small kingdoms along the border. Consequently, Aitakama of Qadesh and Aziru of Amurru chose an aggressive strategy. This led to the protests of their neighbours and a certain degree of concern in the Egyptian court. Their activities were not much different from those of other kings, such as Lab’aya of Shechem or Zimrida of Sidon, but while the latter acted within the Egyptian territories without threatening Egyptian supremacy, Aitakama and Aziru acted on the border, a fact that could have led to their separation from the Egyptian sphere of control.
When Suppiluliuma’s presence was consolidated and Mitannian supremacy suddenly collapsed, the states began to ask for support from each other. The former Mitannian vassals (Qatna and Nuhashe) close to the Egyptian border asked for help from the Egyptian king, recalling their ancient dependence to the dynasty. On the contrary, the Egyptian vassals located along the border (Qadesh, Amurru, and Ugarit) abandoned the Egyptian king and swore their loyalty to the Hittite king. Eventually, Suppiluliuma’s success led to the inclusion of both groups under Hittite control. The Egyptian border, then, moved from Ugarit to Byblos, and from Qadesh to Beqa.
From the second half of the fourteenth century to the thirteenth century bc, Hittite and Egyptian control remained stable. This stability was initially the result of a hostile balance of power, with continuous attempts by the Egyptian kings (from Seti I to Ramses II) to regain control over Qadesh and Amurru. The most famous episode in this regard is the battle of Qadesh, where Ramses II’s attempt to move north was put to a halt. The king had to give up on Qadesh and Amurru, and suffered some incursions reaching as far as Damascus. Despite these setbacks, the Egyptian kings, such as Ramses II in the case of Qadesh, still celebrated their feats or their easy victories over the rebellious cities and tribes on a monumental scale. They did not give up this internal propagandistic agenda even when the border of their territory was established through a treaty between Hattusili III and Ramses II, sealed through an inter-dynastic marriage, rather than military combat.
In the north, it is important to follow the history of Carchemish, Amurru and Ugarit, each significant for different reasons. Carchemish is a unique case. The city had always been important for its strategic location. Suppiluliuma chose it as a privileged seat of power and entrusted it to his son Piyashshili. The latter showed great military talent in placing Shattiwaza on Hanigalbat’s throne, and in dealing with the revolts in Nuhashe and Qadesh. Under his and his successor’s rule, Carchemish became a delegate of Hatti for the control of Syrian affairs. The process culminated in the second half of the thirteenth century bc, with the reigns of Ini-Teshub and Talmi-Teshub.
At that time, the kingdom of Carchemish extended from Emar (whose texts clearly show the dependence of its kings to the kings of Carchemish) to Mukish and Aleppo, and supervised all Syrian affairs. From Tudhaliya IV’s reign onwards, then, Carchemish effectively cut off the Hittite kings’ power over the area. The inter-dynastic legal texts found at Ugarit show that Carchemish’s political and commercial presence in northern Syria became hegemonic. Its kings were therefore able to take full advantage of the delegation of power received from their cousins, the Hittite kings. In the final phase of the empire, and within the overall tendency towards political fragmentation, the kings of Carchemish were able to act independently and to take over the role, as well as the title, of great king.
On the contrary, Amurru was a new kingdom, created in the Amarna period by a talented tribal and military leader, Abdi-Ashirta. The centre of this new state was located in the Lebanese mountains, which acted as the military base for fugitives (habiru) and shepherds. There were no cities and Abdi-Ashirta never held the title of king. Through an intense propaganda addressing fugitives and village farmers, Abdi-Ashirta managed to rise to power, threatening the coastal cities, especially Byblos (whose king Rib-Adda recorded Amurru’s rise in his heartfelt and in vain appeals to the Egyptian king), and the cities in the Orontes Valley. Taking advantage of an attack to the city of Sumura, Abdi-Ashirta volunteered to reconstruct the city and to take on the role of Egyptian delegate over the whole of Amurru, which was the name of the Egyptian province headed by Sumura.
After the death of Abdi-Ashirta, the situation successfully evolved under the leadership of his son Aziru. He consolidated control over Tunip and Sumura, conquered Ugarit and Byblos, and played on the Egyptian fear of his potential alliance to the Hittites. Aziru therefore made Amurru a hegemonic power along the Egyptian border. Suppiluliuma’s victory brought Amurru to leave the Egyptian sphere of control to join the Hittites. However, this new ally turned out to be much more actively involved and demanding in terms of loyalty. Therefore, through his alliance with Hatti, Amurru’s hegemonic role was drastically reduced. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the thirteenth century bc, Amurru’s position alongside the border inspired Benteshina to follow the example of his predecessor Aziru. Benteshina’s alliance with Egypt was the main cause of the war between Ramses and Muwatalli and the battle of Qadesh. Benteshina lost his kingdom, but he regained control over it after cleverly siding with the winner in the conflict between Hattusili and Urhi-Teshub. Having established kinship ties with the Hittite royal family, the last kings of Amurru would maintain the peace until the end of the empire.
Ugarit was a smaller kingdom compared to Amurru, and less powerful than Carchemish. However, it remains particularly important for us ever since excavations uncovered its royal palace, complete with its diplomatic, epistolary, legal and administrative archives. These constitute the main source for the reconstruction of the historical and social developments of Late Bronze Age Syria. As an Egyptian vassal until the Amarna period, Ugarit endured the military pressures of its southern neighbour, Amurru. Not long after this, Ugarit pledged its loyalty to the Hittites. This took place during the reign of king Niqmadu. He restored the city’s royal palace, re-organised its archives, and copied many literary texts. After Niqmadu’s death, Ugarit was involved in the revolts of Mursili II’s early years, thus losing the territories it had previously obtained. During Niqmepa’s and Ammistamru’s reigns, Ugarit’s dependence to Hatti, and more specifically Carchemish, became even more explicit. On top of the standard treaty sealed between Mursili and Niqmepa, further agreements were signed to guarantee the permanence of Hittite merchants in the city, the return of fugitives to Ugarit, and the sanctions to apply in case merchants got killed.
Ugarit’s primary role was commercial. It was the most important Syrian port within the Hittite realm, with privileged relations with Cyprus, the entire Syro-Levantine coast, and Cilicia, reaching the Egyptian Delta on the one side and Crete on the other. Hittite interest in the commercial activities and wealth of Ugarit was in marked contrast with Ugarit’s military involvement. The city often preferred to pay large tributes instead of sending troops to war against the Assyrians. Therefore, Ugarit showed an increasing military and political indifference, which by the last decades of the thirteenth century bc became so evident that it caused several complaints. However, in the final crisis, Ugarit was still able to deploy its fleet and troops to defend the Hittite ruler.
World History
