Old Babylonian kingship

In this period of sudden changes, economic growth, political fragmentation, independence, constant exposure to attacks and growing enslavement, kingship became a fundamental point of reference for stability. In this stabilising role, Old Babylonian kingship developed aspects already present in the Neo-Sumerian period, but with new features and nuances. The traditional role of kingship in society was kept, with royal hymns, celebratory inscriptions, codes and amnesties of clear Neo-Sumerian derivation. Even the practice of deifying kings continued to exist, especially in the south. However, it was only limited to a few, more successful kings, or those who felt they were in a solid enough position to acquire a divine role in the eyes of their subjects. In the north, the king continued to be traditionally seen as strong, as a clear expression of his constant military interventions, which were naturally caused by the political fragmentation of the time.

The kings of the Neo-Sumerian period presented themselves as successful administrators. In comparison, Old Babylonian kings preferred the image of the king as ‘good shepherd’ of his people. This representation not only borrowed the ‘pastoral imagery’ of the Amorites, but also attempted to present an image of care and consideration for the needs of those less fortunate, who were seen as part of a herd in need of a leader. The central interest of the Neo-Sumerian kings had been the administration of the state and its palace and temple functionaries. Now, however, the central interest of the Old Babylonian kings focused on the population of free people and in particular on those more in need of support.

In a world where solidarity between and within families was slowly breaking down, generating a vast number of people without inheritance, the king presented himself in a ‘paternalistic’ light. He became a father and mother to orphans and a support for widows. He also became the one who returned the son to his mother, gave freedom to those enslaved, released debts and re-established social order. Edicts celebrating debt remissions and the liberation of debt-slaves thus became the main instruments in the presentation of this new type of kingship ideology. On closer inspection, however, the regular repetition of these measures demonstrates the kings’ inability to counter the general economic trends of the period. In fact, these trends were inevitably bringing more and more people into debt-slavery.

The state did not have the right measures to tackle the underlying causes of this socio-economic dysfunction and was only able to work on its effects. Consequently, the causes remained, but at least some of the most unfortunate situations were resolved through royal pardons. Creditors and debtors were aware of the frequency of amnesties, making these royal acts a structural aspect of socio-economic relations. It therefore became a standard royal practice to promulgate a remission edict right at the beginning of a ruler’s reign. The phrase ‘year in which X established justice in the land’ became a common year formula for the second year of a king’s reign, the first year being named after his enthronement. In case oflong reigns, these types of edicts were repeated on several occasions. The repetition of reforms (though not at fixed intervals) aimed to celebrate the new king and gain the approval of his subjects. They therefore became an integral part of the economic mechanism of the state and were the only way in which the poorer strata of society could avoid life-long slavery.

Just like the amnesties bestowed upon conquered cities, these edicts, with their presentation of the king as ‘just’, were unapologetically propagandistic. However, the more practical purposes of these measures were always contextualised within a moral and religious ‘code’. For instance, it was the god of Sippar Sha-mash who suggested that Zimri-Lim, king of Mari and conqueror of Kurda, should ‘free’ the land from

Debts. Equally propagandistic was the benevolence of the king towards workers involved in construction works, especially of temples. For instance, the king of Larsa, Sin-iddinam claimed that, instead of simple barley, he provided the workers restoring the Ebabbar with a large amount of meat, dates, cheese and oil. The king’s involvement in public works therefore became a way to celebrate and advertise the wealth of the state.

In some cases, a king’s self-presentation as a ‘just’ king took on more concrete overtones through the commission of law codes. This was becoming an increasingly popular tradition of the time and was started by Ur-Nammu of Ur. We have the code of Lipit-Ishtar of Isin (Text 11.1), a code belonging to an unknown king of Eshnunna and the famous law code of Hammurabi. The aim of these codes was not strictly legal, since the actual implementation of these laws is dubious and probably did not even take place. At the time, law codes were not the main paradigms for legal verdicts. On the contrary, it was the verdicts that shaped the code. Therefore, these law codes were not aimed at releasing new laws to substitute or unify previous laws. They simply showed how well organised and justly administered the state was under the efficient guide of a certain ruler.

The codes were therefore an analytical demonstration of the fact that justice reigned in the land. In those cases where the prologue of a code has survived, this intention is clearly expressed: ‘when the gods entrusted me with the government of the land [. . .] then things happened like this: if a man committed a certain crime, this was the punishment; if a man agreed to this contract, this was the payment’ and so on. All these dispositions derived from the current practice of the administration. They also emphasised the model of a good government, where everything was organised according to fair rules, leaving no space for abuses of power. The idea that, in order to achieve a correct development of social relations, it was necessary to reform the state through new reforms was not part of the government’s ideology or methodology. The underlying assumption was that the correct implementation ofjustice, which followed the existing norms, could not fail to create a prosperous reign. Chaos only arose whenever these norms were not applied. The solution, then, was simply to re-establish justice.

Price lists were also an integral part of these codes (from the one of Ur-Nammu to the one of Eshnunna; see Text 11.2). Even in this case, prices were neither new nor more favourable to the current economic climate compared to previous prices. They were not even the highest and lowest prices, but simply fixed and fair prices (fair because stable), organised through basic correspondences (1:1). Therefore, a basic quantity of barley corresponded to one basic quantity of silver. This almost gave the impression that these prices were natural valuations, rather than prices dictated by the economic situation of the time. These ‘fair’ prices, which to us may seem purely formal and impractical, could have had a significant influence on economic transactions. This is especially due to the presence in the lists of prices for leases, the hiring of workmen and of means of transport. These prices therefore made this type of royal intervention a way to support the weaker party against the abuses of the wealthier stratum of society. Consequently, royal steles were left in market-places as references for the fair prices established by the king. In this way, the economic function of market-places could have increased. This process was further stimulated by the growing number of people who had to depend on exchange in order to survive, and the increasing independence of merchants and craftsmen compared to their former dependence on the palace.

It is true, as Karl Polanyi has pointed out, that we have to distinguish between market-place and market: the former is securely attested (Akkadian mahtrum) in Mesopotamia from the Old Babylonian period onwards; the latter can be defined as a self-regulatory mechanism for prices on the basis of the relation between demand and supply. However, it is also true that the market system was known and applied in the market-place. Even before the Old Babylonian period, but especially in this phase of increased freedom from the palace economy and of commoditisation of land and labour, Mesopotamian trade clearly shows the influence of demand and supply in the establishment of prices. This fact led to the development of two stereotypes. On the one hand, phases characterized by political instability, difficult commercial activities