Apart from a kaleidoscope of beliefs, the Hellenistic world also knew unbelief. Both can be seen as an expression of the fact that there no longer was a polis religion that could be taken for granted. Euhemerus (c. 300 BC) contended that the gods had once been human. Others saw the gods as abstractions or allegories. Developments that had begun in the course of the 5th or during the 4th century reached a high point in the philosophy of the Hellenistic era. Rational criticism carried through to such lengths was, however, rare: most philosophers accepted the existence of the divine, albeit in an abstracted form. Nevertheless, even the religious ideas of less radical philosophers reflect the disappearance of old borders and certainties. This mainly concerns the skeptics and the cynics, who were thriving, and two new currents: the Epicureans and the Stoics. The Aristotelian and Platonic schools also continued to exist; during the Hellenistic period, the latter went through a Skeptic phase. Typical of Hellenistic thought is a tendency toward escapism: all schools, however different, teach how to be detached, how to avoid suffering, and how to be free even if, practically speaking, one is not free.
The Skeptics could boast a long tradition: the founder of the school, Pyrrho of Elis, a contemporary of Alexander, invoked the example of Socrates. Central to Skepticism is the denial of all forms of knowledge, whether based on observation or on rational thought. This leads to a rejection of judgment, so that one may reach an ideal state of complete detachment (ataraxia) through indifference. Cynicism, which likewise saw Socrates as its predecessor, opted for anti-culture: man is free when he rejects all physical needs and social conventions. The cynic is anti-everything and pro-nothing.
In late-4th-century Athens, Epicurus developed a philosophy that built on Democritus’ theory of atoms and taught that natural and human life obey fixed laws and processes, that the gods exist but are incapable and unwilling to intervene in the course of things, and that there is no life after death. Happiness is only for those who manage to reach ataraxia, the state of being without desires. The best thing to do is to leave the world and keep aloof from everything. These ideas were later reduced to a simple “seize the day” message by enemies of Epicurean philosophy.
The Stoa was named after the Stoa Poikile, the “Painted Colonnade” where its founder Zeno (c. 300) conducted his teaching. The school contended that man has the duty to aspire after a virtuous life, in harmony with nature. Nature is governed by logos, reason (to be identified with God, in the singular). Sensory observation and rational thinking will lead to the required knowledge of logos. The inner self of the person who has attained this knowledge will be unmoved, because he sees that all is in accordance with nature and logos; he will then freely and happily accept everything that life has in store for him. Although the teachings of the Stoa are individualistic in character, they did not advocate aloofness but an active role within the world; in this respect, Stoics differed from Epicureans. According to the Stoics, the world and its various manifestations of authority and property did not require change. Since they saw everyone as part of nature and therefore part of logos, the Stoic doctrine had the potential to be critical of the existing social order or even to become a-social. In practice, however, Stoicism did not attack the social order, because the essence of Stoic thinking is acceptance: the sage relies on his inner self, and freedom is inner freedom. The ideas of the Stoa were particularly popular with the Romans. The concept of unmoved acceptance within the fullness of life fitted in with their norms and values, whereas the aloofness of the Skeptics and Epicureans did not.
Traces of the escapism of Hellenistic philosophy may also be found in literature in the form of exoticism, the theme of the noble savage, pastoral poetry, and utopian writings. Some of the foregoing religious phenomena can also be seen against this background. All of this reflects feelings of unrest, nurtured by the loss of koinonia (especially the ever-increasing social inequality) and insecurity brought about by the political changes. This, however, did not result in attempts to change society. The Utopians, like the philosophers, did not preach a rejection of social inequality or slavery; they offered a way to deal with one’s poverty or one’s servitude. The Hellenistic period did not produce any social alternatives. The very few traveling cynic philosophers were a-social loners with hardly any measurable influence. Skeptics, Epicureans, and Stoics at a certain point recoiled from the consequences that might come from their long-running debates about individuality and freedom.