Agathocles becomes King of Sicily

As the Hellenistic kingdoms of the East arose after Alexander’s death, yet another kingdom was being established in the West, on Sicily. Timoleon’s victory there over the Carthaginians in 339 had achieved a welcome respite for all Greek Sicily (see chap. 17). By the 320s, however, civil war had begun anew in Syracuse. An oligarchy, led by a man called Sostratus (or Sosistratus), seized power. When a democratic revolution followed, the exiled oligarchs sought aid from the Carthaginians, who went to war against the Syracusans. The democrats in the city, however, apparently appealed to Corinth for another leader such as Timoleon. By this time Corinth stood under Macedonian overlordship, and Antipater, who as Alexander’s regent in Macedonia had been governing Greece since 336, had installed oligarchies throughout Greece in the late 320s (see chap. 20). The man whom the Corinthians sent out, Acestorides, accordingly supported the Syracusan oligarchs. He re-established peace with the Carthaginians, banished the democrats, and handed Syracuse back over to the oligarchs (Diod. XIX 3-5).

Among the banished democrats, however, stood a man of pre-eminent military talent, Agathocles. In Morgantina, in the Sicilian interior, he succeeded in establishing his own power base. He captured Leontini and waged war against the Syracusan oligarchs (Just. XXII 2) who this time could hope for no help from mainland Greece since Antipater’s successor as regent, Polyperchon, was supporting democracies (see chap. 20). Even within Syracuse the oligarchs had little support and so accepted a necessary compromise (which the Carthaginians helped negotiate), whereby Agathocles returned to Syracuse in 319. He pledged to support the existing government - a nominal democracy - which in return made him general (Diod. XIX 5; Just. l. c.).

When, however, Agathocles judged the time right, he massacred the leading oligarchs (Diod. XIX 6-9). In the next few years he gained possession of other Greek cities on Sicily: Tauromenium by 312 (Diod. XIX 102); Camarina and Catane by 311 (Diod. XIX 110). In 315 he was besieging Messene. Carthaginian intervention, however, compelled him to desist and to make peace with Messene instead (Diod. XIX 65).

Agathocles’ opponents in Greek Sicily had by now recognized the bleakness of their long-term prospects and accordingly sought help from mainland Greece. Given the situation there, with the Greek cities hopelessly subject to the whims of the Diadochi, one might surmise that little help would be forthcoming. Yet a Lacedaemonian called Acrotatus, the son of King Cleomenes II and an officer with exquisite military training and no opportunity for using it, paid for a few ships out of his own pocket and sailed to Taras, which placed an additional twenty at his disposal. He arrived in Acragas early in 315 and assumed command of the forces gathered against Agathocles. However, Acrotatus, whom apparently even the Lacedaemonians considered a stern disciplinarian, soon caused a mutiny from which he scarcely escaped with his life. Taras recalled its twenty ships, and nothing now remained for Agathocles’ enemies but to make their peace with him. In a peace which the Carthaginians helped negotiate, all recognized the Carthaginians’ possession of the northwest of the island whereas the Greek cities elsewhere remained “autonomous,” albeit under Syracusan “hegemony” (Diod. XIX 70-71; cf. XIX 102 regarding Messene’s inclusion in this peace ).

Despite the treaty, Agathocles’ steady consolidation of his position as ruler of Greek Sicily eventually led to war with the Carthaginians. Acragas proved the stumbling block. Presumably as Acragas insisted on its “autonomy” and Agathocles with equal stridency on Syracuse’ “hegemony,” conflict arose, and Acragas sought support from Carthage. In 312 Agathocles marched on Acragas, but broke off the attack when a Carthaginian fleet appeared. Instead Agathocles marched into Carthaginian territory itself. Meanwhile his old political opponents in Syracuse, led now by a man called Deinocrates, revolted with Carthaginian support, and the Carthaginian fleet sailed into the harbor of Syracuse itself while Carthaginian land forces occupied a position near Gela (Diod. XIX 102-104).

Over the winter both sides prepared for a major war. In early 311 the Carthaginians had some 40,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry encamped near Gela. Agathocles marched against them and seized control of Gela itself. Neither side, however, wished to give battle, but the Carthaginians did repel an attack on their camp. When Agathocles withdrew after this failure, he lost large numbers of men as the Carthaginian cavalry harassed his retreat. Agathocles brought the survivors into Gela in the expectation of a siege, but Hamilcar, the Carthaginian general, marched into the interior instead - correctly guessing that news of the battle would weaken Agathocles’ hold over the Greek cities. These all indeed joined Hamilcar’s side, and Agathocles himself hastened to Syracuse to save what he could there (Diod. XIX 106-110).

Now a siege was inevitable, and given the situation in mainland Greece (see chap. 20) no help would come from that quarter. Agathocles, however, had no intention of waiting for his opponents to besiege Syracuse. While he still could, he went on the offensive where they least expected it. With sixty ships and some 13,500 troops he slipped past the Carthaginians’ blockading fleet and, in one of the most dramatic moves in ancient warfare, in 310 invaded their homeland in Africa which they had denuded of troops in order to wage war on Sicily. Before marching inland, to demonstrate to his troops that there was no turning back, he burnt his ships behind him. With no effective opposition he took town after town and led his army to the gates of Carthage itself. On Sicily, Hamilcar had had little success against Syracuse where Agathocles had left behind part of his army under the command of his brother Antander. Hamilcar now hastily sent 5,000 troops from Sicily to Africa, but Agathocles caught them by surprise and destroyed them (Diod. XIX 3-18).

In 309 Hamilcar attempted to besiege Syracuse, but Antander led troops out of the city and inflicted a severe defeat on the Carthaginians. Hamilcar himself fell into the Syracusans’ hands and was tortured to death. Many Greek cities on Sicily now deserted the Carthaginians and formed an alliance among themselves under the leadership of Acragas and with that the Carthaginian invasion of Greek Sicily was at an end (Diod. XX 29-32). In Africa, meanwhile, Agath-ocles, after various minor successes (Diod. XX 33-34, 38-39), had formed an alliance with Ophellas, one of Alexander’s old officers and now the ruler of Cyrene, who still in 308 led some 10,000 troops westwards to Agathocles’ camp. Although Agathocles had promised him the rule of Carthage’s territory, the two soon quarreled, and Agathocles had Ophellas assassinated. Ophellas’ troops, far from home, had little choice but to take service with Agathocles, who thereby effectively doubled his army (Diod. XX 40-42).

Agathocles now captured the important city of Utica as well as the port of Hippu Acra. Other cities in the interior joined him so that he soon controlled almost all Carthaginian territory in Africa - with the exception of Carthage itself. As long as the Carthaginian fleet controlled the seas, however, a siege was impracticable and in any case a Carthaginian fleet was still blockading Syracuse. So Agathocles arranged for the construction of a fleet (cf. App. Lib. 110) and early in 307 returned to Sicily (Diod. XX 54-55). He landed near Selinus in Carthaginian territory and quickly brought most of the northwest of the island under his control - granted without Lilybaeum and Panormus, the two most important cities (Diod. XX 56).

Agathocles, however, had less success against the Greeks on Sicily. Deinoc-rates had collected some 20,000 troops, and Agathocles, badly outnumbered, retreated before them. In Africa, meanwhile, the Carthaginians had collected some 30,000 troops and divided them into three detachments. This forced Agathocles’ deputy, his eldest son Archagathus, to follow suit, but two of his divisions shortly met with catastrophic defeats. With this the Carthaginians regained most of their territory (Diod. XX 57-61). Even Agathocles’ return to Africa could not restore the situation, and when an attack on a strongly defended Carthaginian position failed, Agathocles’ troops began to desert or to mutiny. In late 307 Agathocles returned to Sicily. What remained of his army in Africa, including Archagathus, he left to fend for itself; the army murdered Archagathus and made what terms it could with the Carthaginians (Diod. XX 64-69).

Back on the island Agathocles faced two enemies - the Carthaginians and his Greek opponents under Deinocrates. Agathocles offered terms of peace first to the latter (who stupidly refused them) and then to the former (who, weary of a long and senseless war, accepted them). Agathocles in 306 gave them their territory in the northwest back, and they gave him 150 talents and 200,000 bushels of grain (Timaeus, BNJ 566, Fr. 120; Diod. XX 77-79). Now Agathocles could focus on Deinocrates. Even if Deinocrates had far more troops at his disposal and Agathocles a mere 5,800, Agathocles correctly assumed that his battle-hardened troops would win any pitched battle. After they had done so, Agathocles was once again master of Sicily east of the Halycus. Agathocles offered all exiles the right to return to their homes and in exchange he won general recognition of his rule (Diod. XX 89-90).

Firmly ensconced as lord of Greek Sicily, Agathocles followed the example of the Diadochi in assuming the royal title (Diod. XX 54 - n. b. that for Agath-ocles Diodorus surely has too early a date [307] -; cf. Plut. Demetr. 25). In their political culture, the Sicilians were now aligned with the rest of the Hellenistic world; and all rulers on Sicily who sought to follow in Agathocles’ footsteps (Phintias, Pyrrhus, Hiero II) would call themselves kings. Sicily had become a Hellenistic kingdom.