Our main source for the peace treaty of 298 is the account of Peter the Patrician (c. 500—64).407 In fact, regarding Roman—Sasanian relations in the third century the narrative of this Byzantine historian is the only testimony that provides us with details about the provisions of this agreement.408 Most likely the author had access to archival material and was thus well informed of the diplomatic procedures in the year 298. Nevertheless we must bear in mind that his account is not a copy of the actual agreement but at best a commentary. The specific terms can only be reconstructed through a careful comparison with other sources. These, however, are extremely brief and in contrast to Peter the Patrician yield little information.409 Moreover, Peter’s elaborate narrative gives fascinating insight into the diplomatic relations between Rome and the Persian Empire towards the end of the third century.410
Peter the Patrician, jrg. 13—14
(13) As Apharban, who was a very close friend of the Persian king Narse, had been sent as ambassador, he approached Galerius in supplication. When he had the opportunity to speak he said, ‘It is obvious for all mankind that the Roman and the Persian Empires are just like two lamps; and it is necessary that, like eyes, the one is brightened by the light of the other and that they do not angrily strive for each other’s destruction.411 For this is not held as a virtue but rather levity or weakness. As they believe that later generations will not be able to help them they make an effort to destroy their opponents.’ He continued by saying that it was not necessary to think that Narse was weaker than the other kings but rather to see Galerius as that much superior to the other kings so that Narse himself was inferior to him alone, and rightly so, without, however, proving to be lower in dignity than his ancestors. Apharban added that Narse had given him instructions to entrust, as they were fair, the right of his empire to the kindness of the Romans; that this was why he was not bringing the oaths by which the peace had to be concluded but was handing everything over to the judgement of the emperor, asking only that his children and wives were returned to him, and he claimed that for their return he would owe the emperor more for his benefactions than if spared by his arms. He was not able to thank him appropriately for the fact that those in captivity had not experienced any cruelty but had been treated as if soon to be returned to their own high status at home. In this context he also reminded the emperor of the changeable character of human affairs. But Galerius seemed to be angry about this remark and, with his body beginning to shake, responded that it was not quite appropriate for the Persians to remind others of the changes in human affairs because they themselves did not cease to use every opportunity to add to human misfortune.412 ‘For you guarded the rule of victory well in Valerian’s case, when you deceived him with tricks, took him captive and did not release him until old age and his shameful death, when you, after his death, conserved his skin with some disgusting method and thereby afflicted the mortal body with immortal offence.’413 The emperor414 went through all this and added that his mind was not changed by what the Persian embassy tried to convey, namely that he should respect human fate (because one should rather be enraged by this if one considered what the Persians had done), but that he would follow the footsteps of his own ancestors, whose custom it had been to spare their subjects but to fight the ones who opposed them;415 he told the ambassador to inform his king of the generosity of the Romans, whose kindness he had challenged, and to hope that soon they [the captives] would return to him by judgement of the emperor.
(14) When Galerius and Diocletian had come together in Nisibis, they took counsel there and agreed to send an ambassador to Persia, Sicorius Probus, an archivist. Narse received him in a friendly way expecting to hear what had been reported to him. But Narse also made use of delaying tactics. For as if he wanted the ambassadors who had come with Sicorius to recover (since they were exhausted), he took Sicorius, who knew well what was going on, as far as the Asproudis, a river in Media, until the units who had been scattered here and there because of the war had gathered. And then, in the inner room of the palace, having sent away all others and allowing only the presence of Apharban and of the archapetes Barsaborsos,416 the one of whom was the praetorian prefect and the other held the rule over Syme,417 he asked Probus to deliver his message. The main points of the ambassador’s message were the following: that in the eastern region the Romans should receive Ingilene together with Sophene, Arzanene together with Karduene and Zabdikene and that the river Tigris should be the boundary line between the two states,418 that the fortress ofZintha, which was located on the border of Media, should mark the border of Armenia, that the king of Iberia should owe his royal status to the Romans, and that the city of Nisibis, which lies on the Tigris, should be the place of trade. Narse listened to these points and — as his present situation did not allow him to refuse any of this — agreed to all of them; with the exception, so that he would not seem to be forced to comply with everything, that he rejected the condition that Nisibis should be the only place for exchange. Sicorius, however, responded, ‘This point is a requirement because the embassy does not have full power and no instructions for this have been given by the emperors.’ When these matters had thus been settled, Narsee was given back his wives and children, whose pure reputation had been respected thanks to the emperors’ love of honour.
Already shortly after the decisive defeat in Armenia, which did not leave the Sasanians any prospects for a military success (6), the Persian ruler Narse sent an ambassador to Galerius. The main objective of this embassy was to achieve the release of the royal family whose captivity would represent an asset for the Romans during the negotiations and at least a significant psychological advantage. The man sent to Galerius by Narse was Apharban, who was the commander of the royal guard and thus a high Persian dignitary and intimate friend of the Sasanian king. On the Roman side the negotiations were led by the magister memoriae Sicorius Probus, who was likewise a high official. The Persian ambassador argued that the Roman and Persian Empires were like two lights, two eyes, whose sparkle made each other shine, and they should therefore refrain from destroying each other.419 Although Apharban used this metaphor in order to emphasise the equal rank of both empires his words cannot be dismissed as a feeble attempt to show the Sasanian Empire in a better light. The expressive image must reflect his actual view of the relationship between the two states.420
Apharban then went on to appeal to the Romans’ sense of humanity and justice. However, when he asked for the Persian captives to be treated well and assured the Roman emperor that this would oblige the great king more than a military victory could, Galerius became very angry and interrupted him. The memory of the death of the Roman emperor Valerian in Persian captivity just a few decades before (5) and the circumstances of his death must have been alive among Romans and Persians alike. Nevertheless, Galerius dismissed the Persian ambassador by promising Narse that the captives would return soon. The emperor’s decision was probably motivated by his respect both for Diocletian’s moderate policy and for the Sasanian Empire. The negotiations between Galerius and Apharban were a prerequisite for the conclusion of a formal peace treaty.
When his negotiations with Apharban had come to an end, Galerius rushed to Nisibis where he and Diocletian jointly decided on the terms for a formal peace.421® Afterwards Sicorius Probus went to meet Narse on Persian territory in order to inform him ofthese terms. It seems certain that Sicorius Probus and Narse met in Media but we do not know where exactly on the river Asproudis.31 The region had been conquered by Galerius after Satala but officially it was still part of the Sasanian Empire. Diocletian’s decision to send a middle man to the Persian ruler is surprising; even more surprising, however, is the fact that in spite of the Persian defeat the Roman ambassador crossed the official border and went to meet Narse in order to conclude the treaty.422 In Iranian—Roman relations the venue for peace negotiations was a formal element as important as the accurate diplomatic ceremonial and was also seen to reflect the political balance of power.
Diocletian’s policy in the East was shaped by an attempt not to overexert the capacities of the empire, to refrain from expansion and to be content with a restoration of the borders that had been fixed by the Eastern policy of the Severi. In spite of Diocletian’s strong position in 298 Rome did not show any aggressive or universal aspirations; instead, Diocletian intended to acknowledge the sovereignty of the defeated Sasanian king. This is illustrated by the place where the foedus of 298 was concluded and which was accepted, perhaps even chosen by Rome, together with the moderate terms of the agreement. According to Peter the Patrician Narse had to give his consent to three important Roman conditions. The first of these concerned territory and a clarification of the situation along the Sasanian—Roman and Sasanian—Armenian borders.423 Locating the so called ‘provinces beyond the Tigris’, which had to be ceded to Rome, poses problems (map 8).424
Peter the Patrician singles out five regions: Ingilene and Sophene geographically comprise the area between the Tigris and the Nymphios. The third province, Arzanene, borders these in a south-eastern direction, also situated along the upper Tigris and starting from the eastern banks of the Nymphios.425 Adjacent to this province are the regions Karduene and Zabdikene. A comparison with other sources36 fleshes out our map of the area. The area between the Euphrates and the Nymphios and further east into Karduene actually included nine and not five regions.
Moreover, our author’s statement that the Tigris was supposed to be the new borderline between the two powers seems to contradict the fact that most areas ceded to Rome were located beyond the Tigris. This is confirmed by the ancient author Festus, who wrote in the fourth century and was thus much closer to the events of 298 than Peter the Patrician. Festus claims that the Romans gained power over five peoples across the Tigris.37 Ammianus Marcellinus also mentions the regiones Transtigritanae.338 Differentiating between a situation de-iure and one de-facto may help to explain the diverging accounts of Peter the Patrician and Festus. Whereas the latter describes the official situation which assigns the so called ‘provinces beyond the Tigris’ to Rome, the Byzantine historian describes the real situation that was created by an administrative practice in these provinces soon after 298.39
Iy The peace treaty of 298
127
Map 8: The ‘Trans-Tigritania’
Ancient authors of the fourth century, who talk about contemporary affairs along the border, refer to the Tigris as the actual borderline.426 The Romans withdrew to the western banks of the Tigris; in 298 they refrained from constructing a ‘proper limes’ beyond the Tigris but were content with securing strategically important passes.427
Accordingly, the regions beyond the Tigris which were ceded to Rome in 298 did not become new provinces of the Roman Empire but continued to be administered and ruled by Armenian noble families, who, however, were responsible to Rome.428 Diocletian would not have envisaged a permanent territorial gain for the Roman Empire and left things as they were in
Trans-Tigritania. He must have hoped that such a policy of integration would secure the loyalty of the Armenians.429 In this way, Rome pushed forward the line of defence for the province of Mesopotamia. During the following years, however, we observe new Roman activities with an eye to securing the border region, which illustrate the strategic importance of the area for the West.430 Another territorial clause poses problems.431 According to Peter the Patrician the fortress ofZintha, which was supposed to mark the boundary of Armenia, was situated along the border to Media. If we trust the words of the Byzantine historian, the borders of Armenia would have been shifted considerably eastward. In this case, Armenia would have been compensated for the loss of the ‘provinces beyond the Tigris’ in the area of the Media Atropatene (Azerbaijan) at Sasanian expense. It is also possible, however, that the fortress was situated within the border region Ingileenee, which, as already mentioned, was ceded to Rome and was explicitly named in the treaty because of its strategic importance.
Moreover, any compensation for Armenia by way of a south-eastern extension of its borders is problematic.432 The overall policy of the Roman emperor speaks against an eastward extension of the borders all the way into the area of the Media Atropateenee. Diocletian’s conservative policy rather aimed at securing the status quo. It is noteworthy that Tiridates III was excluded from the peace negotiations of the year 298 although Galerius owed his military success against Narse above all to the help of the Armenian king. Diocletian acted in the name of Tiridates III, who apparently did not have any choice but to acknowledge his dependence on Rome. It does not look, therefore, as if Diocletian felt obliged to compensate Tiri-dates for anything. The latter must have been well aware that his existence depended on the great powers, and this was once more revealed by the treaty of 298.433
According to Peter the Patrician the peace treaty also demanded that in the future the king of Iberia would receive the symbols of his rule from Rome. Narse thus had to acknowledge a Roman protectorate of Iberia, which was situated south of the middle Caucasus and north of Armenia.
Rome thereby ruled over Kolchis and Iberia, which together make up the territory of modern Georgia.48 By placing Iberia under their supremacy the Romans gained crucial strategic advantages over the Sasanian Empire.
The last paragraph of the treaty of 298 concerned primarily economic questions (see also 28).49 The city of Nisibis, which was situated on the Tigris, was named as the only place of trade between the two empires. Peter the Patrician mentions that Narse complained about this condition whereas he seems not to have shown any reaction against the other terms for peace proclaimed by Sicorius Probus. The king’s protest as well as Rome’s firm attitude reveal how much importance both sides attributed to this matter. Narse rejected the clause for good reasons because it entailed that the exchange of goods within Mesopotamia, in particular the local trade along the borders, would be impeded. Correctly, W. Seston interprets this ‘economic clause’ of the peace treaty as complementing the Roman defence system.50 The many caravan routes in upper Mesopotamia and in particular the main waterway, the Euphrates, represented natural conditions for intensive trade and also for close contacts between the neighbouring regions of both states. The official frontier between the Roman and the Persian Empires was therefore somewhat artificial. From a Roman point of view, trying to declare Nisibis as the only place for an exchange of goods between the two empires makes sense, also with regard to the safety of the empire (28).51 After Narse had agreed to Rome’s terms his relatives were returned to him.52 Festus tells us that the king’s family had been treated very mercifully and that this impressed the Persians so much that they admitted to being inferior to the Romans not only in arms but also with regard to common decency.53 It is certainly possible that the return of the captives had been part of the official peace treaty.54 Apparently the treaty was concluded in the autumn of 298 and was ratified by the signatures of Narse and Sicorius Probus. It was a foedus that fulfilled the technical and legal conditions for an agreement that would bind both parties.
Most modern scholars interpret the foedus of 298 as a great political and diplomatic Roman triumph. In contrast, P. Barcelo and R. Klein argue that the final treaty of the year 298 created a situation that was genuinely unacceptable for the Sasanians and hence dangerous. The two scholars talk about a delayed war rather than a real peace, which only lasted as long as it did because for a while the Sasanian king Sapur II was preoccupied with domestic and other foreign affairs. They claim that Diocletian’s wish to fortify the border revealed how much the emperor was aware of the danger.434 According to G. Wirth Rome dictated peace conditions that the Sasanian Empire perceived as threatening its very existence.435 However, such interpretations fail to see the defensive character of Diocletian’s policy.
Moreover, we have to look at Sasanian interests from the perspective of the year 298 and not in light of the following events. Considering Narse’s military defeat, what could he have expected from a peace treaty with Rome, in particular given the fact that his family was held captive by the enemy? His goal for the negotiations was the release of the royal prisoners, and in return he seems to have been prepared to accept any reasonable terms. Diocletian’s demands must therefore be regarded as moderate and restrained. Only if the emperor had acted differently by claiming more Persian territory or had even refused to release the prisoners —which, considering Valerian’s death in Sasanian captivity not long before, might have been considered an option — could one indeed talk of repressions and a treaty that bore the seeds for a new war. As it was, Narse achieved his main goal in the negotiations, the return of the captives, and from a Sasanian perspective this was a success as much as the fact that Rome waived territorial claims. Narse certainly accepted terms that entailed significant strategic and economic disadvantages for the Sasanian Empire but in view of the situation in the year 298 this had been inevitable.
An analysis of the peace treaty of29857 should also point to the fact that in spite of the military and diplomatic defeat the dignified role of the Persian king and the equality between the ‘King of kings’ and the emperor were respected. Rome acknowledged the sovereignty of the defeated Sasanian ruler.58 Likewise, in light of his defeat Narse gave up Sasanian plans for a world empire. Towards the end ofthe third century each ofthe two powers therefore respected the might of the opponent both on a military and a diplomatic level.
World History
