Intensive moralism was not an innovation of the Augustan age. The census concluded in 69 was rigorous: 64 senators were expelled from the body. Plainly the censors agreed with Sulla that moral reform was vital in the aftermath of civil war, a disaster that could only be attributed to depravity on the part of some in the ruling order.2 It was the regular responsibility of censors to organize the People by classes, thereby enabling each man to exercise his franchise. In the aftermath of the Social War, the citizenry had become expanded, but various disputes, and the civil war, had delayed the actual enfranchisement of Rome’s former allies, which was entirely completed only in 84. Finally, in 69, they were enrolled and, thereafter, eligible to vote.3 The sheer abundance and the geographical range of the new population altered Roman politics drastically. Wealthy Italians possessed regional influence and important votes in the centuriate assembly that aspiring politicians needed to court. At the same time, the expanded citizen body also introduced many new candidates, whose presence exacerbated the already keen competition for offices at every level. Fear of failure amplified the
Individual noble’s sense of dignitas and entitlement. It also encouraged all candidates to resort to dishonest means, principally bribery, in order to attract supporters from every order. Illegal electioneering - ambitus - became so pervasive a feature of electoral campaigns that most politicians regarded it as indispensable (see also Chapter 1).4
Despite this decalescence of political society, the nobility continued to dominate in the consulship and in the Senate.5 Nor was the aristocracy threatened by the urban poor. Naturally the Senate could not be entirely indifferent to their circumstances. But, outside emergencies, the status quo could be maintained. The constant practice of electioneering enabled the elite regularly to reinforce their superiority in a context that advertised the People’s sovereignty, during which exercises the masses displayed their gratitude for the preservation of their meager entitlements. The crowd’s volatility was recognized, but the masses were dangerous only when united or organized, conditions that were carefully guarded against by the governing class: hence the Senate’s hostility toward demagogues.6 But it must never be forgotten that the Roman constitution rested on the sovereignty of the People as well as the authority of the Senate. One should not minimize the ideological content of Roman politics: for some (the opti-mates), the prestige of the Senate remained paramount; for others (the populares), concern for the sovereignty of the People was not simply a means to personal popularity but a duty and essential to sustaining the Republic. But there existed a great space between these two positions for posturing and maneuver. Historians no longer regard populares and optimatesas collectives resembling political parties.7 But nor should it be assumed that popularis activities ever constituted a movement against the Senate: all senators were aristocrats invested in the continuity of existing institutions of the Republic. Loyalty to these institutions was not in itself controversial. The actualization of that loyalty, however, was a different matter, more contested and vexatious.8
It is more difficult for us to assess the economic circumstances of the countryside. The ancient sources lay great stress on the diminution of the peasantry (see Chapters 27 and 28). The evidence of archaeology and the application of reason must alter this view: peasants subsisted and were even necessary to the owners of commercial villas devoted to olive and wine production.9 Nevertheless, certain regions, such as Etruria, suffered sorely. Like the urban poor, peasants had few possibilities for organizing themselves into influential bodies. Organization and influence are what the peasantry would find, ultimately, in the legions, whose requirements the Senate tended to despise and whose loyalty, in the end, it let slip. 0 That connection, however, was too dimly perceived at this stage. It had been proposed, in 70, that grants ofland be made to the veterans of the Sertorian War, but the proposal was dropped on the grounds that its execution was unaffordable.11 The veterans’ supine reaction must have convinced the Senate of its unquestioned supremacy.
World History
