It was a member of a related clan, 'Amr ibn al-'As, who launched the most lucrative campaign of this period: into Egypt. This land was a jewel in the Byzantine crown because of the size and constancy of its tax remittances and its harvests, both a consequence of the fertility of the Nile valley. Every year it would dispatch some 300 million bushels of grain to Constantinople, keeping its citizens and the empire's soldiers supplied with bread. Yet despite its wealth, the country's enemies were few, principally the Nuba to the south and the nomadic Blemmyes in the eastern desert regions. The latter are singled out for censure in numerous writings for their lack of regard for the lives of
MAP 3.1 Egypt and adjoining countries.
Monks and the property of monasteries, but their raids were only minor irritants and, after the brief incursion in ad 269 of Zenobia, “queen” of Palmyra, Egypt faced no further external aggression until the seventh century. Perhaps because of this the armies of Egypt were ill prepared when they were obliged to face the onslaught first of the Persians, in 617-19, and subsequently of the Arabs, in 640-42. In the summer of 633 Heraclius ordered his governor of
Numidia (modern west Tunisia/east Algeria) to defend Egypt against Arab attacks, and a couple of years later he sent a certain John of Barqa (modern northeast Libya) to accomplish the same task. Presumably, then, there was some buildup to the main Arab invasion in 640, but since the Muslim sources mention nothing about this we cannot be sure of the identity or objectives of these earlier raiders.4
For the period 640—43 we are lucky to have at our disposal the chronicle of someone who lived through the Arab conquest of Egypt, one John, bishop of Nikiu, though our good fortune is tempered slightly by the fact that we have this text only in the form of a late Ethiopic translation of the Arabic version of the original Coptic account.5 The chronicle covers events from Creation to 643, but frustratingly there is a lacuna from 610 to 639, which means that we only have the word of Muslim sources that 'Amr ibn al-'As set out in the winter of 639—40 with a contingent from Palestine. They say that he traveled westward along the coastal road until he reached Pelusium, at the eastern edge of the Nile Delta, and captured it after a month or so of sporadic fighting. Although this is not verified by any contemporary source, it would certainly make sense for an army invading from the east to subdue Pelusium in order to secure their supply lines as they marched westward. 'Amr then turned southwest in the direction of Babylon, now a suburb of modern Cairo. At this point John of Nikiu picks up the story, and he makes it clear that there were in fact two Arab armies. In addition to that of 'Amr, which is the only one mentioned by the Muslim sources, a second Arab army had been marching from the south, perhaps first sailing across the Red Sea from Arabia and then traveling overland to reach the Nile. After passing to the west side of the river, it proceeded northward until reaching Bahnasa, ancient Oxyrhynchus, which lay about 100 miles south of Babylon, near the southern entrance to the fertile Fayum oasis, presumably intending to join up with their comrades to the north.
'Amr ibn al-'As, “paying no attention to the fortified cities,” had by now reached a place called Tendunias, plausibly the Umm Dunayn of the Muslim sources, which now finds itself on the edge of modern Cairo, on the east bank of the Nile. His objective was to gain control of the Byzantine stronghold of
Babylon, a little to the south, but he was distressed to learn that the Arab division coming from the south was now on the west side of the Nile. Rather than attempt a siege of Babylon while the Arab forces were separated, he sought to entice the Byzantines out into the open. He divided his own army into three units and placed them at the three points on the triangle formed by Babylon (to the south), Tendunias (to the north), and Heliopolis (to the northeast) (Map 3.2). The plan was that while 'Amr’s unit, situated in front of Heliopolis, engaged the Byzantines head-on, the Arab unit placed just north of Babylon would march out and attack them from the rear. The tactic worked and in the early summer of 640 the Arabs achieved their first major victory on Egyptian soil.
MAP 3.2 The Battle of Heliopolis.
The Arab success had a number of significant consequences. The most immediate one was that the Arabs took control of Tendunias, for its garrison had been destroyed in the course of the battle of Heliopolis, any surviving soldiers having quickly taken to their heels and fled. A second consequence was that it brought home to the population that this was no mere ephemeral raid; the threat was real and a plan was urgently needed for how to contain it. Many voted with their feet. As John of Nikiu says, presumably with some exaggeration: “a panic fell on all the cities of Egypt, and all their inhabitants took to flight and made their way to Alexandria, abandoning all their possessions, wealth and cattle.” Even senior military figures quailed; for example, the general charged with defending the Fayum fled to the Delta city of Nikiu, whereupon the southern Arab force marched upon the capital of this rich agricultural oasis and captured it after a bloody battle. Others decided that their interests were best served by collaboration, and John tells us of officials who “began to help the Muslims”6 by arranging transportation and the construction of bridges. Concerning two senior administrators, who were charged with organizing the swift provision of rations to the Arabs, John says that they “loved the heathen and hated the Christians”—we know from the survival of their correspondence that they had remained Christians, but presumably collaboration with the Arabs was deeply unpopular.7 Some went more fully over to the other side, which is recorded by John in laconic terms: “they apostatized from the Christian faith and embraced the faith of the beast.”
Despite their substantial victory at Heliopolis, the Arabs still found it difficult making further headway in their conquest of Egypt. Many of the major cities in the Nile Delta were protected by water, which served as a blockade, impeding the entry of horses. Others, such as Nikiu and Damietta, shut their gates and steadfastly refused to surrender. John goes so far as to say that 'Amr spent twelve months in warring against the Christians of northern Egypt, but “failed nevertheless in reducing their region” (ca. March 640—41). This was a slightly hollow boast, but it is true that the Arabs had not yet managed to take out the most crucial targets. In particular, the great fortress of Babylon remained in Byzantine hands. It occupied an area of some five hectares; the walls were more than fifteen meters high and three meters thick while the circular towers rose higher still and were at least thirty meters in diameter. Moreover, the Nile came right up to the western walls where a small port allowed the Byzantines to get in and out by boat.
The Arabs began to besiege it after the Nile floodwaters had receded, in September 640. They lacked the machinery to break down the walls and so concentrated on sapping the morale of those within the fortress. They constructed a large, low bridge over the river near Babylon to prevent the passage of ships to Nikiu and Alexandria and to facilitate the movement of their own horses and supplies across the river. They arrested officials and confined them in iron and wooden fetters, they pillaged property, burned crops, and “put to the sword all the Byzantine soldiers whom they encountered.” But perhaps most damaging to the morale of the besieged was the news of the death of the emperor Heraclius, who had ruled for over thirty years and had earlier freed Egypt from the yoke of Persian domination, and also the ensuing struggle for the succession, which made it unlikely that help would come from Constantinople any time soon. So when 'Amr promised that the lives of the troops garrisoning the fortress would be spared, they decided to surrender and evacuated their positions on the second day after the festival of the Resurrection, in April 641, after a siege of some seven months. Now 'Amr began the slow but inexorable march on Alexandria, pushing the remaining Byzantine troops northward, their numbers swollen by the garrisons of towns like Nikiu and Kariun, who abandoned their posts at the sight of the approaching Arab soldiers. The latter attempted an early attack on the metropolis itself, but the defenders on the walls rained down stones on them and they were obliged to retreat. There, in the early summer of 641, they pitched camp and hunkered down in preparation for a lengthy blockade of Alexandria.
Modern scholars often argue, on the basis of later witnesses, that the Egyptians who were anti-Chalcedonian (that is, they rejected the creed agreed upon at the council of Chalcedon in ad 451) welcomed the Arabs and only the Chalcedonian Egyptians opposed them.8 However, John of Nikiu never once intimates that he or his fellow anti-Chalcedonians were in any way well disposed toward the conquerors. He also makes clear that the Arabs themselves were indiscriminate in their slaughter and that the disunity among the Egyptians lay not in sectarian differences but in how to face this challenge: whether it was better to submit and make peace or to stand and fight. “A great strife had broken out between the inhabitants of Lower Egypt, and these were divided into two parties.” Of these, one sided with Theodore, the commander-in-chief of the army in Egypt, who was determined to resist, whereas the other side felt that their interests were best served by negotiation and accommodation with the invaders. And this indecision seemed to grip the very highest echelons of government. The elder son of Heraclius promised to send Theodore a large force in the autumn of 641 with which to repel the enemy. However, upon his premature death, his younger brother chose not to respect this promise, and furthermore he reappointed Cyrus, who had been Chalcedonian patriarch of Alexandria during the 630s, but who had been sacked for his conciliatory stance toward the Arabs. Indeed, it was known that Cyrus not only favored paying tribute to the invaders in exchange for peace but had recommended offering one of the emperor's daughters in marriage to 'Amr, “with a view to his being consequently baptised in the holy bath and becoming a Christian, for 'Amr and his army had great confidence in Cyrus and regarded him with great affection.”9 This proposal had angered Heraclius's elder son, but his successor gave Cyrus power and authority to make peace with the Arabs, to check any further resistance against them, and to establish a system of administration appropriate for the new circumstances.
Cyrus arrived in Alexandria in early September 641. He went to the great Caesarion church in the city to celebrate the feast of the holy cross on September 17, and the people covered the whole route and chanted hymns in his honor. Presumably many supported the dovish policy of Cyrus and thought that some sort of deal with the Arabs was the best way forward for Egypt. Once he had consulted with the elite of Alexandria, Cyrus went to Babylon, seeking by the offer of tribute to procure peace and put a stop to the war in Egypt. 'Amr welcomed his arrival and said to him: “You have done well to come to us.” And Cyrus answered, saying to him: “God has delivered this land into your hands; let there be no enmity henceforth between you and Rome.” They fixed the amount of tribute to be paid and agreed that the Arabs would keep to themselves for eleven months, not intervening in
Egyptian affairs, while the Byzantine troops in Alexandria would be allowed to remove all their possessions and equipment and proceed home by sea. No other Byzantine garrisons could replace them and they were to cease all fighting against the Arabs, while the latter for their part were to desist from seizing any churches and meddling in Christian concerns. Furthermore, Jews were to be permitted to remain in Alexandria. As a guarantee, the Arabs would take as hostage 150 soldiers and 50 civilians.
Cyrus returned with a heavy heart to Alexandria and reported the terms of the agreement to Theodore, the commander-in-chief, so that he might inform the emperor and persuade him of the merits of the treaty. He also acquainted the populace with the results of the deliberations and the conditions of the agreement. Many were at first incensed by what they perceived as an excessively favorable settlement for the enemy and they rose up against the patriarch and sought to stone him. But he said to them: “I have made this treaty in order to save you and your children,” and though overwhelmed by tears and grief he entreated them to be reasonable. Grudgingly the Alexandrians complied and raised the sum of gold that had to be handed over to the Arabs. Those Egyptians who had fled and taken refuge in Alexandria begged to be able to return to their homes and Cyrus negotiated this on their behalf. And so the Arabs “took possession of all the land of Egypt.” Cyrus died not long afterward, the following Easter, and so he did not live to see the handover of Alexandria, which happened in accordance with the treaty at the end of September in the year 642. Theodore left the city with his troops and officers and 'Amr made his entry without any obstruction. Looking back, the event seems momentous, marking the end of a millennium of Greco-Roman dominion over Egypt and the beginning of an even longer period of Muslim rule, but what perhaps struck contemporaries more was that they had lost God’s favor. “None could recount the mourning and lamentation which took place in that city. . . . They had none to help them and God had destroyed their hopes and delivered the Christians into the hands of their enemies.” Yet this was not then seen as final, for “the strong beneficence of God will put to shame those who grieve us, and He will make His love for man to triumph over our sins and bring to naught the evil purposes of those who afflict us.”
Our chronicler, John of Nikiu, halts his narrative here, but other sources report that there was one Byzantine attempt to recapture Egypt. The emperor Constans dispatched an Armenian general named Manuel with instructions to oust the Arabs. According to a mid-eighth-century account he meets with 'Amr ibn al-'As and approaches him in a disdainful manner, saying: “I am not Cyrus the bishop who gave you money out of fear of you, for he was a pious monk, whereas I am a man of arms, war and valour,” and he warns him to leave at once “or I will destroy you.” However, in battle he is quickly worsted by 'Amr. Muslim sources are also familiar with the Armenian Manuel. In their version Constans resolves to recapture Egypt when its inhabitants send him a letter informing him that the number of the Muslims in Alexandria was small and the condition of the Byzantines there was pitiful. Accordingly, Manuel set sail from the imperial capital with 300 ships packed with warriors. Initially they were successful: they expelled the Arabs garrisoned in Alexandria and launched guerrilla raids against those stationed in the villages around the city. News of this reached 'Amr and he set out toward them with an army of 15,000 men. He engaged the enemy and a struggle ensued that was so heated that it made it into Muslim apocalypses as one of the precursors to the final battle of Armageddon. The Arabs were in the end victorious and this time they used various machines of war to breach the walls of Alexandria. A proportion of the inhabitants decided to leave for lands still under Byzantine control and thenceforth Alexandria remained in Muslim hands.10